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Rom: From Carlin's Seven to Bono's One: The Federal Communications Co

FROM CARLIN’S SEVEN TO BONO’S ONE:
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION’S REGULATION OF THOSE
WORDS YOU CAN NEVER SAY ON
BROADCAST TELEVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1961, the new chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) gave a speech to the National
Association of Broadcasters that became famously known as “The Vast
Wasteland” speech.1 In a brave move, Chairman Newton Minow
challenged the broadcasters in attendance to watch their own channels,
free of distraction.2 He warned the broadcasters that they would find a
vast wasteland:
You will see a procession of game shows, violence,
audience participation shows, formula comedies about
totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder,
mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, Western badmen,
Western good men, private eyes, gangsters, more
violence and cartoons. And, endlessly, commercials—
many screaming, cajoling and offending. And most of
all, boredom. True, you will see a few things you will
enjoy. But they will be very, very few. And if you think
I exaggerate, try it.3
More importantly, Chairman Minow challenged the broadcasters to
remember that they were accountable, not to the financial shareholders,
but to the shareholders of the airwaves—the viewing public.4 He also
noted that children spend as much time watching television as they do in
school, and accordingly asked the broadcasters, “Is there no room on
television to teach, to inform, to uplift, to stretch, to enlarge the capacities
of our children?”5
In 1978, the Supreme Court echoed Chairman Minow’s concern for
children when it held that the broadcast media’s pervasiveness and
accessibility to children warranted applying lesser First Amendment

1
Newton N. Minow, Speech Before the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9,
1961), reprinted in Television and the Public Interest, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 395 (2003).
2
Id. at 398.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 399.
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scrutiny to the regulation of broadcast indecency.6 This decision, in
response to George Carlin’s famous Seven Words You Can Never Say on
Television monologue, established that expletives should not be broadcast
on the public airwaves.7
Three decades later, the Parents Television Council (“PTC”) released
the results of an exhaustive study that analyzed instances of foullanguage on the broadcast airwaves during primetime.8 Compared to
1998, the PTC found that nearly twice as many expletives were aired
during primetime network television during 2007.9 In addition, the PTC
found that “harsher” forms of expletives were used, such as variations of
“fuck” or “shit.”10 These results appear to support Chairman Minow’s
vast wasteland and demonstrate a need for the FCC to regulate such
content.11
In the years since Chairman Minow’s speech, the FCC has become
more active in cleaning up the vast wasteland via indecency regulation.12
Responding to highly publicized instances of fleeting indecency on
broadcast television, the FCC in 2004 changed its indecency policy so
that variations of the words “fuck” and “shit” would be considered
indecent per se.13 However, the FCC may not presume that variations of
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (finding that the ease of access and
government’s strong interest in the well-being of youth justified special treatment of
indecent broadcasting). The iconic Carlin, who is remembered for his comic and “furious
social commentary,” died at age seventy-one on June 22, 2008. Mel Watkins & Bruce
Weber, George Carlin, Comic Who Chafed at Society and Its Constraints, Dies at 71, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2008, at C12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/24/arts/24carlin.
html?pagewanted=1&_r=1#.
7
See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (holding that Carlin’s monologue was indecent in
the broadcasting context); Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM)
(Pacifica Complaint), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975) (declaratory order) (articulating an indecency
policy in response to the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue).
8
Press Release, Parents Television Council, PTC Finds Increase in Harsh Profanity on
TV (Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://parentstv.org/PTC/news/release/2008/1029.asp.
The Parents Television Council analyzed all primetime television entertainment programs
broadcast on the major networks between 1998 and 2007. Id.
9
Id. The PTC recorded 11,000 expletives in 2007. Id.
10
Id. (“Not only are harsher profanities like the f-word and s-word airing during hours
when children are likely to be in the viewing audience, but they are airing with greater
frequency.”). The PTC found that in 1998, ninety-two percent of expletives on broadcast
television could be categorized as “mild.” Id. In 2007, seventy-four percent of the
expletives were categorized as “mild,” while nearly a quarter of the expletives were a form
of fuck, shit, or bitch. Id. In 2007, half of the instances of the variations of “fuck” were
broadcast during the 8:00 p.m. viewing hour. Id.
11
See infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the PTC study to rebut critics of
FCC indecency regulation).
12
See infra Part II.B (discussing the creation of an indecency policy).
13
See infra notes 76–84 and accompanying text (summarizing the changes to the FCC’s
indecency policy). See generally Katherine A. Fallow, The Big Chill? Congress and the FCC
6
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“fuck” and “shit” are presumptively indecent without violating the
Constitution.14 In addition, because of the recent litigation questioning
the validity of the FCC’s per se prong of its indecency policy, it is unclear
what policy standards must be followed.15 Thus, the FCC must revise its
current indecency policy to continue protecting the public’s convenience,
interest, and necessity, to remedy the constitutional problems with the
FCC’s indecency policy, and to protect broadcasters’ free speech by
putting them on clear notice of what type of content should be avoided.16
To this end, Part II provides a background of the FCC’s regulatory
history and scheme, including Congress’s mandate that the FCC regulate
in the public interest, convenience, and necessity, with a focus on
indecency policy.17 Part III argues that the FCC’s new fleeting indecency
policy is unconstitutional, but that the FCC must still regulate broadcast
indecency for the public convenience, interest, and necessity.18 Part IV
proposes a new indecency policy that provides clearer guidelines.19
II. BACKGROUND
Part II provides a background of the FCC’s regulatory history and
scheme, focusing on its indecency policy.20 Congress created the FCC to
regulate the broadcast spectrum.21 Since its creation in 1934, the FCC has
exercised its powers according to the public convenience, interest, and
Crack Down on Indecency, COMMC’N LAW., Spring 2004, at 1 (illustrating the publicity and
action taken following the 2003 Golden Globe Awards and 2004 Super Bowl Halftime
show).
14
See infra Part III (discussing the unconstitutionality of fleeting indecency policy).
15
See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted and vacated, 129 S. Ct.
2176 (2009) (remanding in light of Fox v. FCC); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d
444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Fox v. FCC and heard oral arguments on Nov. 4, 2008. Transcript of Oral Argument,
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1647 (2008) (No. 07-582), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-582.pdf.
The main issue on appeal was whether the FCC had adequate reasoning for changing its
indecency policy. Id. See Courtney Livingston Quale, Note, Hear an [Expletive], There an
[Expletive], But[t] . . . the Federal Communications Commission Will Not Let You Say an
[Expletive], 45 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 207, 251 (2008) (providing a summary of the oral
arguments); infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court’s
decision). See also infra notes 86, 91 (discussing the Administrative Procedure Act and the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard).
16
See infra Part IV (proposing new policy).
17
See infra Part II (discussing the statutory creation of the FCC and its regulatory
history).
18
See infra Part III (discussing validity of justifications and unconstitutionality of fleeting
indecency policy).
19
See infra Part IV (proposing future action for the FCC).
20
See infra Parts II.A–D (using a chronological approach).
21
See infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of the FCC).
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necessity.22 The FCC is empowered to regulate broadcast indecency, and
in recent years its policy has garnered much attention.23 Part II.A
discusses the FCC’s congressional authority and the judicial support of
this statutory authority, as well as how First Amendment principles
interact with the FCC’s regulatory scheme.24 Part II.B discusses the
development of the FCC’s indecency policy.25 Part II.C discusses the
FCC’s change in its treatment of fleeting indecency.26 Finally, Part II.D
discusses the Second Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s treatment and
rejection of the FCC’s fleeting indecency policy.27 Overall, Part II
provides the necessary foundation for the analysis that the FCC’s policy
for fleeting indecency is unconstitutional and for the contribution of a
proposed policy that protects both the public’s interest and the broadcast
media’s right to free speech.28
A. The FCC’s Statutory Authority and Powers
The Radio Act of 1927 (“Radio Act”) was the first major piece of
broadcasting legislation.29 The airwaves spectrum, according to the
Radio Act, was as a public resource that no individual could claim as
property.30 In addition, the Radio Act established the Federal Radio
22
See infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s mandate that the FCC
regulate for the public convenience, interest, and necessity).
23
See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the regulation of
broadcast indecency as applied); Fallow, supra note 13 (discussing recent applications of the
FCC’s indecency policy).
24
See infra Part II.A (discussing legislation and Supreme Court decisions).
25
See infra Part II.B (using FCC orders and federal court decisions).
26
See infra Part II.C (discussing recent FCC orders that depart from previous policy).
27
See infra Part II.D (providing a summary of Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489
F.3d 333 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)).
28
See infra Parts III, IV (analysis of FCC policy and contribution of new policy).
29
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). With the Radio Act of 1927,
Congress created a government allotment system in which the government retained
ownership over the broadcast spectrum, but allowed private individuals, firms, or
corporations to operate channels under a license in order for a private marketplace to exist.
Id.
30
Id. § 1 (stating that the government is to maintain control over all channels of radio
transmissions and is to provide the “use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof,
by individuals, firms, or corporations . . . under licenses granted by Federal authority”).
“Broadcasting” is defined by statute as “the dissemination of radio communications
intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations.” 47
U.S.C. § 153(6) (2006). See generally Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public
Interest” Standard: The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605 (1998). The Radio Act
of 1912 was the first piece of legislation that governed radio. Id. at 608. It gave the
government the power to issue licenses by request, but did not allow for the denial of
licenses because the government had assumed that the spectrum could accommodate all
frequencies requested. Id. However, the unregulated growth of the industry resulted in
too many frequencies and interference. Id. In response, then Secretary of Commerce
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Commission (“FRC”) to regulate as “public convenience, interest, or
necessity” required.31
Seven years later, Congress passed the
Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”), which created
the FCC.32 The Communications Act maintained much of the language
of the Radio Act and required that the FCC enforce and execute the
provisions according to the public convenience, interest, and necessity.33
Herbert Hoover promoted a system of self-regulation, and he first expressed the idea that
the public owned the airwaves. Id. At a 1925 radio conference, Hoover stated, “[t]he ether
is a public medium, and its use must be for public benefit.” Id. (quoting Herbert Hoover,
U.S. Sec’y of Commerce, Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and
Recommendations for Regulation of Radio 7 (Nov. 9–11, 1925) (Government Printing Office
1926)). The public’s right to the airwaves spectrum became the central idea of the Radio
Act of 1927. Id.
31
Radio Act of 1927, § 4. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981).
The Supreme Court has given deference to the FCC’s interpretation of the public interest.
Id. “Our opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission’s judgment regarding
how the public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial deference.” Id. See
also infra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of
the public convenience, interest, and necessity as factors). See generally Krasnow &
Goodman, supra note 30, at 60 (discussing the early application of the public interest
standard as extending to both technical matters and programming content).
32
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–613). The Communications Act of 1934 repealed the Radio
Act of 1912, abolished the Federal Radio Commission, and gave the FCC power to regulate
communication services by telegraph, telephone, cable, and radio. 78 CONG. REC. 12,405
(1934). See 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (“The [FCC] may perform any and all acts, make such rules
and regulations, and issue such orders . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions.”). The President appoints five members to the FCC, and, along with Congress,
designates one of the five as chairman. Id. § 154(a). See also FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) (stating that Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934
under fear that “in the absence of governmental control the public interest might be
subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field.”). In order to
determine the proper procedures to follow, administrative agencies must follow both the
statute authorizing the agency’s power and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS 293 (5th ed. 2009). The APA provides four types of procedures including formal
adjudication, informal adjudication, formal rulemaking, and informal rulemaking. Id. at
294. These four methods serve as a starting point, but the authorizing statute “acts as the
basis for determining which of the procedures described in the APA an agency is required
to use in taking particular types of actions.” Id. at 295. Thus, the FCC is bound by both the
APA and any procedures specified within 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–613. See id. (“[T]he APA and
agency organic acts must be read in pari materia in order to determine the procedures an
agency must follow in a given case.”).
33
Communications Act of 1934, § 303. See also Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 30, at
626. The public interest standard could be considered a double-edged sword: “The
flexibility inherent in this elusive public interest concept can be enormously significant to
the FCC not only as a means of modifying policies to meet changed conditions and to
obtain special support but also as a source of continuing and sometimes hard-to-resolve
controversy.” Id. See generally Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Communications Act of 1934 and Telecommunications Act of 1996—United States
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In order to create a pro-competitive market that would allow for
technological advancement, Congress enacted major updates and
changes through the Telecommunications Act of 1996 but maintained
that the FCC’s main objectives were the public convenience, interest, and
necessity.34
The FCC’s licensing and regulatory powers include policing radio
wave traffic and the composition of that traffic, such as choosing among
those who apply for broadcast licenses.35 Such powers may appear to be
broad, but these powers are limited by what the FCC determines is in the
public’s best interest, convenience, and necessity.36 According to the
Supreme Court Cases, 32 A.L.R. FED. 2D 125 (2008) (summarizing important Supreme Court
cases that construe and apply the Communications Act of 1934).
34
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (maintaining
“public convenience, interest, or necessity” language). The Telecommunications Act of
1996 was originally introduced as the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation
Act of 1995. S. 652, 104th Cong. (1995). The Act was introduced “[t]o provide for a procompetitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies
and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition,
and for other purposes.” Id. See generally Adam Candeub, Media Ownership Regulation, the
First Amendment, and Democracy’s Future, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1607 (2008) (suggesting
that media ownership regulation should be aimed at “creating a better agency relationship
between elected officials and the citizenry” and that political discourse will improve if the
government regulates media ownership).
35
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214–16 (1943) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303, which lists
the powers of the FCC). See generally JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES,
RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN MEDIA 361 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the FCC’s licensing
procedures); Leonard M. Baynes, Making the Case for a Compelling Governmental Interest and
Re-Establishing FCC Affirmative Action Programs for Broadcast Licensing, 57 RUTGERS L. REV.
235 (2004) (arguing that the FCC should employ affirmative action practices when
assigning licenses); Matthew A. Klopp, Constitutional Malfunction: Does the FCC’s Authority
to Revoke a Broadcaster’s License Violate the First Amendment?, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 309,
327 (2005) (arguing that the FCC’s power to revoke a broadcaster’s license based on content
is a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment).
36
See NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (stating that the public interest, convenience, and necessity
standard is not to be interpreted as so indefinite to provide an unlimited power); Pottsville,
309 U.S. at 137–38 (stating that consideration of the public interest, convenience, and
necessity is the touchstone created by Congress). In 1946, the FCC published “Public
Service Responsibilities of Broadcast Licensees” to articulate its view of the public interest
standard. Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The Failure and
Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 21 (2004).
This report:
[S]pecified that licensees were required to devote an “adequate”
amount of broadcast time to the coverage of local, national and
international issues of public concern. It instructed broadcasters that
they were expected to air a “reasonable” number of “sustaining”
programs, meaning programs not sponsored by commercial
advertising but funded by the broadcaster itself, and local live
programming. It warned licensees that they should limit advertising
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Supreme Court, the public interest standard serves as an instrument for
discretion and is characteristic of the fluid nature of broadcasting.37
Because the nature of the broadcasting industry and the public interest
standard are subject to change, the FCC must act within its statutory
duty to adjust its regulations.38 The factors’ fluidity, however, is not
intended to create an indefinite assignment of power, and as such, the
factors must be interpreted through the scope, character, and quality of
services at issue, as well as through the First Amendment.39
The First Amendment mandates that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”40 FCC licensing regulations
have been challenged on First Amendment grounds, but the Supreme
Court has held that no free speech right exists in possessing a broadcast
license.41 In NBC v. United States, the Court found that the FCC did not
violate the First Amendment by denying broadcast licenses based on
to “a reasonable amount” of overall programming time. A new FCC
broadcast license renewal form required applicants to report on their
program offerings in six categories: education, entertainment, news,
religion, discussion and talks.
Id. (quoting FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946))
(internal footnotes omitted).
37
See Pottsville, 309 U.S. at 138. In Pottsville, the Pottsville Broadcasting Company
(“PBC”) appealed the FCC’s denial of PBC’s application for a permit. Id. at 139. The FCC
based the denial on the grounds that PBC was financially disqualified and failed to
adequately support local interests. Id. at 139. Instead of reviewing PBC’s application
standing alone, the FCC considered it against two other potential broadcasters in order to
compare and determine which would best serve the public’s interest. Id. at 140. The court
of appeals reversed the FCC and ordered the FCC to consider PBC’s application according
to the court of appeals’ decision. Id. at 140. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the administrative law issues. Id. at 135. The Court found that because the FCC
committed legal error and did not give PBC legal rights beyond those possessed by the two
other applicants, the court of appeals could not create a priority in the administrative
policy that Congress had not created. Id. at 145. The Court said that to force the FCC to
follow the court of appeals’ order would cause “contingencies of judicial review and of
litigation,” rather than the public interest, to become decisive factors in determining which
private entity would receive a license. Id. at 145–46.
38
NBC, 319 U.S. at 225 (“If time and changing circumstances reveal that the ‘public
interest’ is not served by application of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the
Commission will act in accordance with its statutory obligations.”). See Krasnow &
Goodman, supra note 30, at 625 (stating that the public interest standard is useful in
“keeping up with changing means of communication”).
39
NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (citing Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage
Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933)) (“This criterion is not to be interpreted as setting up a
standard so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power.”). See generally ZELEZNY, supra note
35, at 356 (discussing the limited First Amendment protection afforded to the broadcast
media as compared to the print media).
40
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41
See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing NBC, 319 U.S. 190 and Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)).
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public interest, convenience, or necessity.42 In so holding, the Court
reasoned that, by its nature, broadcasting is not available to all who wish
to use the airwaves, and unlike other modes of expression, the use of the
broadcast airwaves may be permissively denied to some. 43 Moreover, in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Court reiterated that the scarcity of
broadcast airwaves permitted the government to regulate access and use,
and that the people, not the broadcasters, “retain their interest in free
speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.”44

42
319 U.S. at 227. In NBC, the Court held that the FCC had congressional authority to
regulate chain broadcasting, and that the regulations as enforced were lawful exercises of
power. Id. at 224, 226. In the case, NBC and CBS networks brought suit to enjoin the
enforcement of the chain broadcasting regulations promulgated by the FCC. Id. at 193.
The facts showed that the FCC undertook a detailed investigation into the practice of chain
broadcasting and consequently enacted several regulations directed at distinct practices
deemed detrimental to the public interest. Id. at 196–97. The networks attacked the
regulations as beyond the FCC’s regulatory scope, as arbitrary and capricious, as a result of
an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power, and as violating free speech rights
under the First Amendment. Id. at 209. See generally The Impact of the FCC’s Chain
Broadcasting Rules, 60 YALE L.J. 78 (1951) (discussing that the FCC had done little to enforce
its chain broadcasting rules, and as such, the broadcast industry practices had not changed
substantially).
43
NBC, 319 U.S. at 226. The NBC court stated “[f]reedom of utterance is abridged to
many who wish to use the limited facilities of radio” because “[u]nlike other modes of
expression, radio inherently is not available to all.” Id. The Court further explained: “That
is [radio’s] unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is
subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use
it must be denied.” Id. Thus, because Congress properly delegated licensing power to the
FCC, there would be no denial of free speech so long as the FCC used the public interest,
convenience, and necessity standard when granting and rejecting licenses. Id. at 227. See
Varona, supra note 36, at 60 (comparing the scarcity of radio to newspaper). Varona states
that “[t]he use of broadcast spectrum is ‘rivalous,’ meaning that its medium is of fixed
capacity and prone to interference if speakers are not ‘channeled’ and restricted in their
activities. Newsprint, by contrast, is nonrivalous. Anyone wishing to be a newspaper
publisher may be one.” Id.
44
395 U.S. at 390 ( “It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences . . . .”). Red Lion dealt with the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine—which has since been abandoned as a policy. See
Jerome A. Baron, What Does the Fairness Doctrine Controversy Really Mean? 12 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 205 (1989). The case also discussed the equal time provision of the
Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006); ZELEZNY, supra note 35, at 389
(“Use of time [on a broadcast channel] by a candidate triggers the broadcaster’s obligations
to provide equal opportunities.”). The Court explained that once a broadcaster possesses a
license no constitutional right exists to monopolize the license. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389. In
addition, the First Amendment allows the government to require a licensee to present
views and voices that are representative of the community, which would otherwise be
barred from the airwaves. Id.
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This scarcity rationale has traditionally served as the primary
justification for broadcast regulation, including indecency regulation.45
B. The FCC’s Indecency Regulation Policy
To ensure that the broadcast airwaves function according to First
Amendment principles, the FCC is prohibited from censoring broadcast
communications and from promulgating any regulation that would
interfere with free speech rights.46 Although the FCC cannot censor
broadcasts, Congress empowered it to enforce a criminal statute that
prohibits the broadcast of obscene, indecent, and profane language on
the public airwaves.47
45
See infra Part II.B (providing a chronological presentation of the FCC’s indecency
policy changes and case law).
46
47 U.S.C. § 326. The statute states in full:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which
shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
Id. However, as common practice, the FCC may consider the content of past broadcasts
when considering a licensee’s renewal application. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
736 (1978) (citing KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670 (1931)). In
addition, 47 U.S.C. § 326 “was not intended to limit the Commission’s power to regulate
the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane language.” Id. at 737.
47
See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 30, 44 Stat. 1162, 1173 (1927) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006)) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.”); Indus. Guidance On the Comm’n’s Case Law
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement Policies Regarding Broads. Indecency (2001
Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001) (policy statement) (“Congress has given the
[FCC] the responsibility for administratively enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 1464. . . . [T]he
Commission may revoke a station license, impose a monetary forfeiture, or issue a warning
for the broadcast of indecent material.”). Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1464 as part of the
Radio Act of 1927, but later moved the provision to the criminal code. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
738. See also 47 C.F.R.§ 73.4165 (2008) (regulation for obscene language); 47 C.F.R. § 73.4170
(2008) (regulation for indecent language).
The Supreme Court, in Cohen v. California, held that obscenity is an unprotected form
of speech, but that the government may not criminalize distasteful or offensive utterances
without a particularized and compelling purpose. 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). Cohen, the
appellant, was arrested for wearing the phrase “Fuck the Draft” printed on a jacket into a
courthouse. Id. at 16. The Court stated that the speech at issue did not fall within the
limited categories of speech that do not enjoy First Amendment protection, such as
obscenity. Id. at 19–20. The Court reasoned that, while such speech may be vulgar or
offensive to some, this is a necessary side effect of open debate. Id. at 24–25. As this note is
concerned with indecency, there will be no further discussion of obscenity. See generally
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (articulating the test for obscenity).
In Duncan v. United States, the Ninth Circuit upheld a charge of broadcasting profane
language. 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931). The court defined profane language as “[i]rreverent
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In 1975, the FCC first articulated an indecency policy in response to a
radio broadcast of George Carlin’s Seven Words You Can Never Say on
Television.48 The FCC described the standard for indecent material as
“language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.”49 But when few
toward God or holy things.” Id. at 133. Because Duncan’s broadcast included the phrase
“By God” irreverently and announced an intention to curse others in the name of God, the
court found that Duncan could be punished under the words of the statute. Id. at 134. For
discussion of the words “obscene, indecent, and profane” in the statute, see generally
United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing the meaning of indecent as
distinguished from obscene); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972)
(discussing definitions of profane and indecent); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th
Cir. 1966) (discussing the distinctions between obscene, indecent, and profane).
48
See Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM) (Pacifica
Complaint), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975) (declaratory order). This decision arose out of George
Carlin’s famous Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television monologue, a recording of
which was broadcast on a New York radio station around 2:00 p.m. Id. para. 4. The FCC
received a complaint from a father who tuned into the broadcast while driving with his
young son in the car. Id. para. 3. The monologue consisted of dirty words that, according
to Carlin, should not be said on the public airwaves. Id. para. 5. The FCC forwarded the
initial complaint to the radio station for comment. Id. para. 6. In its response, the station
explained that the monologue was aired as part of a weekly program that discussed
contemporary society’s attitudes about language. Id. para. 6. It was the radio station’s
view that Carlin was a social satirist and his monologue was a natural contribution to the
discussion. Id. In addition, the radio station said that it had warned listeners of the
potentially offensive language. Id.
The FCC’s order began by listing four reasons why the broadcast medium may be
regulated more rigorously than other forms of expression, including that:
(1) children have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised
by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where people’s
privacy interest is entitled to extra deference; (3) unconsenting adults
may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is
being or will be broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space,
the use of which the government must therefore license in the public
interest.
Id. para. 9 (internal citation omitted). The FCC singled out the use of radio by children as
especially compelling. Id. The FCC then defined indecent language as that which is
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards. Id. at para. 11.
49
Pacifica Complaint, 56 F.C.C.2d para. 11. The FCC used nuisance law, which channels
behavior as opposed to actually prohibiting behavior, as a model for its policy. Id. In
applying its new standard to the Carlin monologue, the FCC found that the words used
“depict[ed] sexual and excretory activities and organs in a manner patently offensive by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium and [were] accordingly
‘indecent’ when broadcast on radio or television.” Id. para. 14. However, the FCC did not
impose sanctions because it was using the case as an opportunity to clarify its policy
standards. Id. The Commission defended its policy because the number of words that fall
under the definition was limited and because during late hours such words with some
value could be broadcast if warning was given. Id. para. 16. Moreover, the Commission
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children are in the audience, the FCC stated that the standard could
change and the Commission would also consider the literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value of the alleged indecent speech.50 The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, overturned the policy, which led to
the seminal Supreme Court case, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.51
In Pacifica, the Supreme Court considered whether the words at issue
were indecent under 18 U.S.C.§ 1464 and whether the FCC’s announced
policy violated the First Amendment.52 The Court found that Carlin’s
felt that a lack of action could lead to “widespread use of indecent language on the public’s
airwaves, a development which would (1) critically impair broadcasting as an effective
mode of expression and communication, (2) ignore the rights of unwilling recipients, and
(3) ignore the danger of exposure to children.” Id.
50
Id. para. 12 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating that the indecency
definition would remain the same, but the FCC would consider literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value). In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court set out a three-part test for
obscenity. 413 U.S. at 24. The third factor in the test for obscenity asks whether a work as a
whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. The Court provided
the example of medical books that depict human anatomy as depictions that would be
potentially obscene, but would fail the third factor. Id. at 26. See generally Edward John
Main, The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary, Artistic, Political, or
Scientific Value, 11 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1159 (1987) (discussing the interpretation of the third factor
of the Miller test). Main describes the third factor as the most important prong of the
obscenity test, because it is “the diagnostic trait by which a work is classified as protected
speech” and “identifies the fundamental interest behind the [F]irst [A]mendment
guarantee of free speech: the unrestrained communication of ideas.” Id. at 1176.
51
Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that despite the FCC’s best
intentions, the effect of its order was to inhibit the free exchange of expression), rev’d 438
U.S. 726 (1978). The D.C. Circuit characterized the FCC’s order as direct censorship in
violation of 47 U.S.C. § 326. Id. at 14.
52
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734. In Pacifica, the Court limited its review to whether the FCC’s
policy was constitutional as applied to the particular broadcast of Carlin’s monologue. Id.
at 742. An “as applied” challenge involves evaluating how the challenged policy or statute
“operates in practice against the particular litigant and under the facts of the instant case,
not hypothetical facts in other situations.” 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187 (2008). In
contrast, “a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute requires a showing that no
set of circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid.” Id. (citing Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990)). The Court denied Pacifica’s allegation
of overbreadth and stated that indecency must be governed by context. Id. In addition, the
Court stated that while some broadcasters may censor themselves, the FCC’s standard
would only deter patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and
activities, which in the Court’s view, lie at the perimeter of First Amendment. Id. at 743.
Unconstitutional overbreadth means that a statute or policy prohibits a substantial amount
of protected speech which limits the free exchange of ideas. United States v. Williams, 128
S. Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008). However, the Supreme Court describes the invalidation of statutes
or policies on overbreadth grounds as “strong medicine,” especially when such statutes or
policies proscribe particularly harmful speech. Id. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
769 (1982) (“Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its face at the
request of one whose own conduct may be punished despite the First Amendment, we
have recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is ‘strong medicine’ and have employed it
with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’”) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
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monologue may have been protected in other contexts, but distinguished
the broadcast media in two ways:
First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.
Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but
also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder. . . .
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read.53
The Court found that the ease of access to broadcasting and the
government’s strong interest in the well-being of youth justified special
treatment of indecent broadcasting.54
After the Pacifica decisions, the FCC followed a narrow policy of
indecency regulation limited to excessive uses of dirty words such as
those in Carlin’s monologue.55 However, in 1987, the FCC enunciated a
601, 613 (1973)). Thus, the Court requires that an overbroad statute or policy must reach a
“substantial” amount of protected speech, in relation to the statute’s or policy’s overall
sweep. Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1838 (2008). In order to determine whether a statute or policy
is overbroad, courts must first construe the challenged statute and then determine whether
the statute covers a substantial amount of protected speech. Id. at 1838, 1841.
53
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49 (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970))
(internal citation omitted). Thus, the Court undertook a contextual analysis that involved
distinguishing the broadcast medium from other forms of expression. Id. at 74748. The
Court recognized these two bases of distinction in addition to the traditional basis of
scarcity. Id. at 748. Like the FCC, the Court narrowed its holding based on nuisance
theory, which requires consideration of relevant variables such as time of day, content of
program, and differences in medium. Id. at 750. See generally Joshua B. Gordon, Note,
Pacifica is Dead. Long Live Pacifica: Formulating a New Argument Structure to Preserve
Government Regulation of Indecent Broadcasts, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2006) (discussing and
critiquing Pacifica in more detail).
54
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. The Court quoted to Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968),
for the proposition that the “government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ and in
supporting ‘parents’ claim to authority in their own household’ justified the regulation of
otherwise protected expression.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. In Ginsberg, the owner of a
lunch-counter violated state law by selling obscene magazines to a sixteen-year-old. 390
U.S. at 631. The Court found that because the state had an interest in protecting the wellbeing of minors, it was within the right of the state to regulate the sale of obscene materials
to minors. Id. at 639. See generally MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN:
“INDECENCY,” CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH (2001) (discussing the
assumption that children need to be protected from indecency to protect their
development).
55
See Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, para. 10 (1975)
(memorandum opinion and order) (“We intend strictly to observe the narrowness of the
Pacifica holding.”); New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to All Broad. &
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broader policy.56 The Commission stated that broadcasts with repetitive
uses of sexual or excretory words and phrases were not the only
broadcasts that could be found indecent; however, if complaints were
concerned only with the language of a broadcast, then a finding of
deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive way would be
necessary to find the broadcast indecent.57 If the indecency alleged went
beyond language, the context of a particular broadcast would then be
examined.58 The FCC reiterated that the nuisance rationale underlaid its
indecency policy and rejected the scarcity rationale as its main
authorization to regulate indecency.59 In addition, the Commission
Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2726 (1987) (public notice) (stating that the
Commission had previously limited enforcement efforts to the seven particular words in
the Carlin monologue).
56
New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726. This enforcement policy was
issued in order to clarify the policies which arose out of three warnings issued earlier the
same month. Id. See generally Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987)
(memorandum opinion and order); Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987)
(memorandum opinion and order); Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987)
(memorandum opinion and order).
57
New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726; Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R.
para. 13. In addition, the FCC put broadcasters on notice that it would enforce indecency
on a case by case basis, including broadcasts after 10:00 p.m., because evidence had shown
that many children were still in the audience after that time. New Indecency Enforcement
Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726. Prior to this policy clarification, the practice had been to
allow indecent broadcasts after 10:00 p.m. if such broadcasts were preceded by a warning.
Id. In each of the three warnings issued during the same month of 1987, the indecent
broadcasts occurred after 10:00 p.m. Id. See Infinity Broad. Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. para. 27 n.47
(stating that the preference was a case-by-case determination, but that midnight represents
a time when less children would be in the audience). In Infinity, the FCC stated that the
hours between midnight and six in the morning represented the time during which
broadcasters could air indecent material accompanied by a warning, because the risk that
children would be in the audience during that time frame was low. Id.
58
New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726; Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R.
para. 13 (“[S]peech involving the description or depiction of sexual or excretory functions
must be examined in context to determine whether it is patently offensive under
contemporary community standards applicable to the broadcast medium.”).
59
New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726. See NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943) (reasoning that the scarcity rationale allowed the FCC to regulate the
broadcast airwaves). Some argue that a lack of scarcity in the modern media supports a
near-complete deregulation of the broadcast airwaves. See ZELEZNY, supra note 35, at 360
(discussing whether the scarcity rationale is still valid); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr, The
Irrelevant Wasteland: An Exploration of Why Red Lion Doesn't Matter (Much) in 2008, The
Crucial Importance of the Information Revolution, and the Continuing Relevance of the Public
Interest Standard in Regulating Access to Spectrum, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 911 (2008) (arguing that
Red Lion and the scarcity rationale are no longer relevant); Ian J. Antonoff, Comment, You
Don’t Like It . . . Change the (Expletive Deleted) Channel!: An Analysis of the Constitutional
Issues that Plague FCC Enforcement Actions and a Proposal for Deregulation in Favor of Direct
Consumer Control, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 253, 273 (2005) (“Because of the everincreasing availability of broadcast and communication media, the government no longer
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stated its belief that channeling indecent broadcasts into certain time
periods represented a valid time, place, and manner restriction on
speech.60
In 1988, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals (“D.C.
Circuit”) upheld the broader policy, but also found that channeling
indecent broadcasts after midnight was arbitrary and capricious because
the FCC failed to adequately consider what time constraints should be
drawn.61 Before the FCC could respond to the court’s order, Congress
passed legislation that required the FCC to monitor indecent broadcasts
twenty-four hours a day, which the FCC codified as part of its
needs to be concerned with the reservation of resources as far as communication is
concerned.”); Matthew C. Holohan, Note, Politics, Technology, & Indecency: Rethinking
Broadcast Regulation in the 21st Century, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 341, 366 (2005) (“Because
technological developments have blurred the distinction between broadcast and nonbroadcast electronic media, differing treatment of these forms of communication is no
longer legally defensible.”). See also Quale, supra note 15, at 228. Quale explains that when
broadcast television switches to digital transmissions in 2009, the “combination of analog
frequency reclamation and the augmented broadcasting potential through the use of digital
frequencies” will make “the limited and scarce nature of the electromagnetic
spectrum . . . arguably . . . nonexistent.” Id.
60
New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2726 (citing City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976)). The Commission explained that, like an owner of a movie theater, who can limit
the admission of children to certain films, the broadcast medium must be able to enforce a
practicable means to separate adults from children in the broadcast audience. Id. at 2726.
See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 512 (1998) (discussing time, place, and
manner restrictions generally). Time, place, and manner restrictions are valid if the
regulation is neutral, the incidental burden on speech is no more than necessary, and it
“promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation.” Id.
61
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act I), 852 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(vacating the Infinity and University of California decisions). The court also rejected claims
that the definition was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 1339–40. The
appellants argued that the generic indecency definition, as distinguished from the “seven
dirty words” definition, was impermissibly and inherently vague. Id. at 1337–38. The void
for vagueness doctrine stems from due process, not First Amendment, jurisprudence.
United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008). A statute or policy is
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to put a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that his
or her conduct violates the law, or if a lack of standards encourages discriminatory
enforcement. Id. (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)). In ACT I, the court
discussed the Supreme Court’s finding of indecency in Pacifica, which it understood as
implicitly rejecting that the FCC’s policy was impermissibly vague. ACT I, 852 F.2d. at
1339. Appellants also argued that the definition was overbroad because it lacked an
exception for material with merit. Id. In rejecting the argument, the court reiterated that
the government’s strong interest in protecting children could outweigh any merit of a
particular broadcast. Id. at 1340. According to the court, the “overall value of a work will
not necessarily alter the impact of certain words or phrases on children.” Id. Thus, the
overall value of material does not prevent a finding of indecency. Id. See supra note 52
(discussing constitutional overbreadth).
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administrative code.62 In 1991, the D.C. Circuit struck down the total ban
as unconstitutional.63 A year later in 1992, Congress mandated that the
FCC adopt regulations that would create a safe harbor between the
hours of midnight and six in the morning, during which broadcasters
could air indecent broadcasts.64 Once again, the D.C. Circuit ruled on the
constitutionality of the regulations.65
In Action for Children’s Television (“ACT III”), the court found that the
FCC had demonstrated that the creation of a safe harbor period
62
Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228 (1988) (requiring the FCC to enforce 18
U.S.C. § 1464 twenty-four hours a day); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1990). The regulation stated in
full: “The Commission will enforce the provisions of section 1464 of the United States
Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. 1464, on a twenty-four hour per day basis in accordance with
Pub. L. No. 100-459.” Id. See generally Michael J. Cohen, Note, Have You No Sense of
Decency? An Examination of the Effect of Traditional Values and Family-Oriented Organizations
on Twenty-First Century Broadcast Indecency Standards, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 113, 118
(2005) (discussing the development of safe harbor periods in more detail).
63
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT II), 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(stating that Congress’s mandate was unconstitutional because the congressional debates
preceded the 1988 decision and nothing in the intervening months had changed the 1988
decision’s precedential value). The ACT II court ordered the FCC to:
[R]edetermin[e] . . . the times at which indecent material may be
broadcast, to carefully review and address the specific concerns [the
court] raised in ACT I: among them, the appropriate definitions of
children and reasonable risk for channeling purposes, the paucity of
station- or program-specific audience data expressed as a percentage
of the relevant age group population, and the scope of the
government’s interest in regulating indecent broadcasts.
Id. at 1510 (citing ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1341–44) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64
See Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949, 954 (1992); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1993).
The regulation stated in full:
(a) No licensee of a radio or television broadcast station shall broadcast
any material which is obscene. (b) No licensee of a public broadcast
station, as defined in 47 U.S.C. 397(6), that goes off the air at or before
12 midnight shall broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.
any material which is indecent. (c) No licensee of a radio or television
broadcast station not described in paragraph (b) of this section shall
broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight any material
which is indecent.
47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1993).
65
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT III), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Appellants challenged the regulations for the following reasons:
First, the statute and regulations violate the First Amendment because
they impose restrictions on indecent broadcasts that are not narrowly
tailored to further the Government’s interest . . . second, [the
regulation] unconstitutionally discriminates among categories of
broadcasters by distinguishing the times during which certain public
and commercial broadcasters may air indecent material; and third, the
Commission’s generic definition of indecency is unconstitutionally
vague.
Id. at 659.
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furthered a compelling government interest and was narrowly tailored
to further that interest.66 The court stated that the regulation reduced
children’s exposure to indecent broadcasts and did not overly interfere
with adults’ ability to watch and listen to such material.67 As a result, the
court upheld a safe harbor period between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.68
In 2001, the FCC issued comprehensive industry guidance that
described its methods for regulating indecent broadcasts.69
The
guidance stated that to support a finding of indecency, first, “the
material . . . must fall within the subject matter scope of [the] indecency
definition—that is, the material must describe or depict sexual or
excretory organs or activities,” and second, “the broadcast must be
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium.”70 When making indecency determinations, the
Id. at 661, 667 (“[W]e believe the Government’s own interest in the well-being of
minors provides an independent justification for the regulation of broadcast indecency.”).
The court had examined empirical evidence that suggested fifty-five percent of respondent
children watched television without parental supervision. Id. at 661. In addition, the court
differentiated broadcasts from cable subscriptions, stating that: “[B]roadcast audiences
have no choice but to ‘subscribe’ to the entire output of traditional broadcasters. Thus they
are confronted without warning with offensive material.” Id. at 660.
67
Id. at 667 (“Although the restrictions burden the rights of many adults, it seems
entirely appropriate that the marginal convenience of some adults be made to yield to the
imperative needs of the young.”).
68
Id. at 669. See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2007) (current form of the regulation). The
regulation had also included a public broadcaster exemption which allowed some
broadcasters to begin airing indecent material at ten p.m. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1993).
Because the court found that neither Congress nor the Commission had adequately
explained the exception, it concluded that the midnight to six a.m. safe harbor was invalid.
ACT III, 58 F.3d at 669. The mere fact that Congress included a lesser time period negated
its argument that starting at midnight was the least restrictive means. Id. at 668. Although
the court found that, standing alone, the midnight to six a.m. safe harbor was
constitutional, it could not ignore the ill-explained exception, and thus, struck the more
restrictive time period. Id. at 669.
69
Indus. Guidance on the Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 &
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broads. Indecency (2001 Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R.
7999 (2001) (policy statement) . The FCC discussed the judicial and legislative decisions
that have shaped the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, noting that the First Amendment
limits how the FCC can regulate indecent content. Id. paras. 3–6, at 8000–01.
70
2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. paras. 7– 8, at 8002 (citing WPBN/WTOM License
Subsidiary, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 1838, 1840–41 (2000)). This two-prong analysis consisted of an
objective indecency definition and a subjective patently offensive test. Id. The FCC stated
that the under the patently offensive prong, “community standard” is not a local
determination, but that the standard is “that of an average broadcast viewer or listener and
not the sensibilities of any individual complainant.” Id. para. 8, at 8002 (quoting
WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, 15 F.C.C.R. at 1841). The language “contemporary
community standards” is taken from the test for obscenity articulated in Miller v. California.
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In Miller, the Supreme Court rejected the notion of a national
standard and stated that an attempt to find a national standard would be an “exercise in
66
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FCC said it would consider the full context of challenged broadcasts.71
The Commission highlighted the principle contextual factors as:
futility.” Id. at 30. Moreover, the Court stated, “[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally
sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.” Id. at
32. While the Court was silent in Pacifica about the contemporary community standard
applied to broadcast media, the Court has extended the Miller reasoning to non-broadcast
media. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002) (“[In the Internet context, i]f a
publisher chooses to send its material into a particular community . . . it is the publisher’s
responsibility to abide by that community’s standards.”); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124–25 (1989) (finding that for “dial-a-porn” services, just because
“distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subject[] to varying community
standards” a federal statute will not be “unconstitutional because of the failure of
application of uniform national standards of obscenity”); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 744–745 (1973). See generally Michael Kaneb, Note, Neither Realistic nor Constitutionally
Sound: The Problem of the FCC’s Community Standard for Broadcast Indecency Determinations,
49 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1084–85 (2008) (comparing the FCC’s indecency policy to obscenity
statutes for the internet, cable, and telephone). Kaneb argues that the FCC’s use of a
national community standard is inconsistent with First Amendment jurisprudence and its
regulatory responsibilities, and thus that the Supreme Court should require the FCC to
apply local community standards. Id. at 1085.
71
2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 9, at 8002. The FCC stated that such contextdependent determinations are highly fact-specific and that various factors have been
considered in past cases. Id. para. 9, at 8003. To illustrate, the Commission included a
sample of cases in which indecency complaints were granted and rejected. Id. paras. 13–23,
at 8004–15. The examples included radio and television cases. Id. The FCC included the
following radio broadcast as an example of an indecent broadcast due to the “inescapable”
sexual content:
I whipped out my Whopper and whispered, Hey, Sweettart,
how’d you like to Crunch on my Big Hunk for a Million Dollar Bar?
Well, she immediately went down on my Tootsie Roll and you know,
it was like pure Almond Joy. I couldn’t help but grab her delicious
Mounds, . . . this little Twix had the Red Hots. . . . [A]s my Butterfinger
went up her tight little Kit Kat, and she started to scream Oh, Henry!
Oh, Henry! . . . Well, I was giving it to her Good’n Plenty, and all of a
sudden, my Starburst . . . . [S]he started to grow a bit Chunky
and . . . [s]ure enough, nine months later, out popped a Baby Ruth.
Id. para. 14, at 8006. Compare that broadcast to the following which was not found to be
indecent:
As you know, you gotta stop the King, but you can’t kill
him . . . So you talk to Dick Nixon, man you get him on the phone and
Dick suggests maybe getting like a mega-Dick to help out, but you
know, you remember the time the King ate mega-Dick under the table
at a 095 picnic . . . you think about getting mega-Hodgie, but that’s no
good because you know, the King was a karate dude . . .
Power! Power! Power! Thrust! Thrust! Thrust! First it was Big
Foot, the monster car crunching 4x4 pickup truck. Well, move over,
Big Foot! Here comes the most massive power-packed monster ever!
It’s Big Peter! (Laughter) Big Peter . . . . Formerly the Big Dick’s Dog
Wiener Mobile. . . . So look out Big Foot! Big Peter is coming! Oh my
God! It’s coming! Big Peter! (Laughter).
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(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or
depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2)
whether the material dwells on or repeats at length
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities;
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been
presented for its shock value.72
In its discussion of the second factor, the FCC stated that the repetition of
sexual or excretory materials exacerbates a broadcast’s offensiveness and
that fleeting references usually do not support a finding of indecency.73
After issuing this guidance, the FCC began to crack down on indecency
and further broadened the scope of materials considered indecent.74
C. Development of Fleeting Indecency Regulation
In a 2004 attempt to further regulate indecency, the FCC changed its
policy regarding potentially indecent fleeting materials in Golden Globe
Awards.75 The first change concerned applying the first step of the

Id. para. 15, at 8007.
72
2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 10, at 8003. The FCC stated that no single
factor is determinative, but that the factors are balanced in order to ultimately determine
what is indecent. Id. The illustrative examples provided by the FCC were divided based
on these three factors. Id. at 8003, 8008, 8010. In the first set of examples, the Commission
stated that under the first factor, the likelihood of indecency increased as the explicitness
and graphic nature of the broadcasts increased. Id. para. 12, at 8003. In the second set of
examples, a lack of repetition had often weighed against a finding of indecency under the
second factor. Id. para. 17, at 8008. Finally, in the third set of examples, the third factor
depended upon the apparent purpose for which the material was presented. Id. para. 20, at
8010.
73
Id. para. 17, at 8008. The FCC stated:
Repetition of and persistent focus on sexual or excretory material have
been cited consistently as factors that exacerbate the potential
offensiveness of broadcasts. In contrast, where sexual or excretory
references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in
nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding of
indecency.
Id.
74
See infra Part II.C (discussing new fleeting indecency policy).
75
See Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globe Awards), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, para. 8, at 4978
(2004) (memorandum opinion and order). In 2004, the FCC acted in response to numerous
complaints about the Golden Globes awards show, during which the singer Bono uttered
the word “fucking” on live network television. Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 3, at
4975–76. An FCC panel originally did not find the utterance indecent, but a full panel
reversed. Id. paras. 1–2, at 4975. See also Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads.
Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8, 2005 (2006 Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, para. 74, at 2684 (2006)
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indecency test, which is whether the material described sexual or
excretory activities.76 The FCC stated that in its view, “given the core
meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a variation, in any
context, inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls within
the first prong of our indecency definition.”77 Thus, the Commission
found that any use of “fuck” would meet the requirements of the first
step of the indecency analysis per se.78 Likewise, the FCC found that
variations of the word “shit” have an inherently excretory connotation,
and presumptively meet the requirements of the first step of the
indecency analysis.79
Second, in determining whether the material dwelled on or repeated
the sexual or excretory organs or activities under the second step of the
indecency test, the FCC stopped placing disproportionate weight on
whether material was repeated or fleeting.80
Instead, the FCC
(notices of apparent liability and memorandum opinion and order) (changing application
of the indecency test’s first step for uses of “shit”).
76
Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 8, at 4978. In 2001, the FCC articulated that, in
order for material to be found indecent, “the material must describe or depict sexual or
excretory organs or activities,” and “the broadcast must be patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.” 2001 Industry Guidance,
16 F.C.C.R. paras. 7–8, at 8002 (citing WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R.
1838, 1840–41 (2000)).
77
Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 8, at 4978 (finding this conclusion consistent
with the Supreme Court’s determination in Pacifica that “fuck” depicts sexual activities).
The FCC then asked whether the use of “fuck” was patently offensive under contemporary
community standards. Id. para. 9, at 4979. Because no political, artistic, or any other
independent reason was offered for the word’s use, the FCC found that its use was
shocking and gratuitous. Id. In the Commission’s view, a failure to take action against
such shocking and gratuitous language “when children were expected to be in the
audience . . . would likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive language.” Id.
78
See id. para. 8, at 4978. The per se rule includes non-literal uses of “fuck”, such as
Bono’s use of “fucking” as an adjective. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d
444, 459 (2007) (discussing literal and non-literal uses of the f-word); Complaints Regarding
Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, para. 23,
at 13308 (2006) (order) (upholding prior 2006 Order and stating that “any strict dichotomy
between ‘expletives’ and ‘descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory functions’ is
artificial and does not make sense in light of the fact than an ‘expletive’s’ power to offend
derives from its sexual or excretory meaning”).
79
2006 Order, 21 F.C.C.R. paras. 74–78, at 2684–85. The FCC found “shit” had an
inherently excretory meaning. Id. para. 74, at 2684. In addition, the Commission explained
that some words, such as “shit” and “fuck,” are so grossly offensive that they are
presumptively profane. Id. para. 19, at 2669. However, the FCC also stated that this
presumption can be overcome if it is demonstrated that the language was essential for
education or artistic purposes, or of a matter of public importance. Id.
80
Compare Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 9, at 4979 (memorandum opinion and
order) (“Neither Congress nor the courts have ever indicated that broadcasters should be
given free rein to air any vulgar language, including isolated and gratuitous instances of
vulgar language.”), with 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 17, at 8008 (“[W]here
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emphasized its contextual analysis, which would equally apply the three
principle factors explained in 2001 Industry Guidance and take “into
account the manner and purpose of broadcast material.”81
Finally, the FCC explicitly abandoned past precedent that indicated
isolated or fleeting broadcasts would not be found indecent.82 The
Commission put broadcasters on future notice that a lack of repetition
does not mandate that “otherwise patently offensive” material is not
indecent.83 The FCC justified its new approach to indecency because, in
sexual or excretory references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in
nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding of indecency.”).
81
2006 Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at para. 15, 2668. For example, the FCC explained that:
[M]aterial that panders to, titillates, or shocks the audience is treated
quite differently than material that is primarily used to educate or
inform the audience. In particular, we recognize the need for caution
with respect to complaints implicating the editorial judgment of
broadcast licensees in presenting news and public affairs
programming, as these matters are at the core of the First
Amendment’s free press guarantee.
Id. This contextual approach was applied in Young Broadcasting of San Francisco, Inc., 19
F.C.C.R. 1751 (2004) (notice of apparent liability for forfeiture).
In Young, the alleged indecency took place when a morning news show hosted performers
from the “Puppetry of the Penis” stage show. Id. para. 3, at 1752. The two performers wore
capes, but were nude underneath. Id. During the course of the interview, the performers
offered to demonstrate the “puppetry,” and the news hosts agreed. Id. Although the
performers demonstrated their talents off-screen, the penis of one performer was fully, but
briefly, exposed on-camera. Id. Young Broadcasting challenged the allegation of
indecency, in part, due to the fleeting duration of the depiction. Id. para. 11, at 1755. The
FCC compared the full frontal nudity in Young to full frontal nudity in the film Schindler’s
List, which was found to be incidental to the broadcast and was not pandering, titillating,
or shocking in context. Id. para. 14, at 1756. See WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15
F.C.C.R. 1838, para. 13, at 1842 (2000) (“[B]roadcast of Schindler’s List [was] not patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium . . . . Based on the full context of its presentation . . . including the subject matter of
the film, the manner of its presentation, and the warnings that accompanied the broadcast
of [the] film . . . .”). However, the FCC found the newscast depiction to be graphic, explicit,
and, under the third factor, intended to titillate, pander to, and shock viewers. Young, 19
F.C.C.R. para. 14, at 1757.
82
Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 12, at 4980. The FCC quoted the Pacifica policy
that required a deliberate and repetitive use of expletives in a patently offensive manner in
order to be found indecent. Id. The FCC then departed from that portion of the policy and
“any similar cases holding that isolated or fleeting use of the ‘F-Word’ or a variant thereof
in situations such as this is not indecent and conclude that such cases are not good law to
that extent.” Id. Additionally, the FCC stated that this change in policy was not
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pacifica because the Court left open the
issue of whether occasional expletives were indecent. Id. para. 16, at 4982. The
Commission justified the change on the same basis as Pacifica: the well being of children
and the ease with which children access the broadcast medium. Id.
83
Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 17, at 4982 (“By our action today, broadcasters
are on clear notice that, in the future, they will be subject to potential enforcement action
for any broadcast of the ‘F-Word’ or a variation thereof in situations such as that here.”).
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its view, a lack of action would lead to more widespread use of offensive
language when children would be in the audience.84 In 2007, the new
policy’s justifications and application were challenged in court.85
D. Fleeting Indecency Policy Tested: Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,
489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007)
In Fox v. FCC, the Second Circuit reviewed the FCC’s policy outlined
in Golden Globe Awards and 2006 Order, and rejected the FCC’s policy to
sanction fleeting materials because the policy was arbitrary and
capricious.86 In order to determine if the FCC’s policy changes were
The FCC found the Golden Globes broadcast indecent, but did not issue a penalty because
previous policy would have permitted the broadcast, and there was not requisite notice to
support a monetary penalty. Id. para. 15, at 4981–82.
84
Golden Globe Awards, 19 F.C.C.R. para. 9, at 4979.
85
See infra Part III.C (discussing the Second Circuit and Supreme Court case addressing
the FCC’s fleeting indecency policy).
86
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1800
(2009). See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court’s reversal
of the Second Circuit). The case was before the court as a petition for review after the FCC
had issued notices of liability to Fox and CBS for broadcasts that included uses of “shit”
and “fuck.” Id. at 453. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); 47
U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (describing the administrative policies for judicial review of an agency
decision). The court explained that:
Agency action is arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise.”
Fox, 489 F.3d at 455 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). Agencies are free to change policies, but an agency must
know that it has changed course, provide valid reasons for the change, and show that such
changes are within the agency’s authority. Id. at 456 (quoting N.Y. Council, Ass’n of
Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1985)). This
includes requiring that the agency explain why the reasoning behind the prior policy is no
longer dispositive: “a flip-flop must be accompanied by a reasoned explanation of why the
new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old rule.” Id. at 457 (quoting N.Y.
Council, 757 F.2d at 508). See generally PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 32, at 388
(describing the arbitrary and capricious test).
Accord CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 175 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding the FCC’s fleeting
indecency policy to be arbitrary and capricious when used to assess a $550,000 forfeiture
penalty), cert. granted and vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009) (remanding in light of Fox v. FCC).
CBS v. FCC was before the Third Circuit as a petition for review, because CBS appealed the
monetary forfeiture imposed upon it by the FCC under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) for broadcasting
indecent material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999. Id. at 171. The
material deemed indecent was broadcast as part of the Super Bowl XXXVIII halftime show
in February 2004 featuring musical performers Justin Timberlake and Janet Jackson. Id.
The musical act consisted of Timberlake’s popular song “Rock Your Body,” sexually
suggestive choreography, and the lyrics “gonna have you naked by the end of this song.”
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done for valid reasons, the court addressed each of the rationales put
forth by the FCC to justify those changes.87 The FCC first reasoned that
its policy protected children from suffering the first blow of isolated or
fleeting expletives, but the court rejected this rationalization because the
theory bore no rational relation to the FCC’s actual indecency policy.88
The court stated that viewers, including children, would still be forced to
Id. at 171–72. While Timberlake sang the excerpted lyric he tore away a part of Jackson’s
bustier which exposed her breast for nine-sixteenths of one second. Id. at 172. CBS had a
five-second delay in place for verbal indecency, but no such technology for video images
was implemented. Id. Approximately ninety million viewers watched the halftime show,
and the FCC received a large number of complaints about the incident. Id. at 171.
Following an investigation into the incident, with which CBS complied, the FCC
subsequently issued a $550,000 forfeiture order. Id. at 171–72.
In its review of the order, the court agreed with the Second Circuit in Fox that the FCC
had changed its indecency policy with regard to fleeting materials. Id. at 178. However,
the FCC argued that CBS should have known that fleeting or isolated material was
actionable due to the FCC’s decision in Industry Guidance On the Commission’s Case Law
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement Policies Regarding Broads. Indecency (2001
Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001). Id.; see supra notes 71–72 and accompanying
text (describing the contextual approach). The court rejected this argument, because the
FCC’s enforcement precedent did not support this assertion. CBS, 535 F.3d at 180. The
FCC further argued that Golden Globe Awards applied only to fleeting expletives, not
fleeting images, such as nudity. Id. at 181; see supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text
(discussing the Golden Globe Awards order). Thus, according the FCC, it applied its 2001
indecency approach and the forfeiture order was not a retroactive application of Golden
Globe Awards. CBS, 535 F.3d at 181. The court also rejected this argument, because the FCC
had never differentiated between images and utterances in any prior decisions or orders.
Id. The court stated that the proper inquiry was whether:
[T]he FCC’s characterization of its policy history is accurate. If it is not,
then the FCC’s policy change must be set aside as arbitrary and
capricious, because it has failed to even acknowledge its departure
from its former policy let alone supply a ‘reasoned explanation’ for the
change as required by State Farm.
Id. at 183. See generally State Farm, 463 U.S. at 39–57 (describing standard for determining
whether agencies have properly adapted its rules to changing circumstances). Because the
evidence showed that the FCC had never treated images or utterances differently, and
because the FCC refused to acknowledge a change in policy, the court held that the policy
“of including fleeting images within the scope of actionable indecency is arbitrary and
capricious . . . and therefore [is] invalid as applied to CBS.” CBS, 535 F.3d at 189. On
alternative grounds, the court also found that the FCC misapplied the concept of
respondeat superior to CBS, but this topic is outside the scope of this note. See id.
87
Fox, 489 F.3d at 457 (noting that the court may only consider reasons put forth by the
agency itself).
88
Id. at 458. The court also stated that the FCC had failed to adequately explain why its
policy for the previous thirty years allowed fleeting expletives to be an acceptable first
blow. Id. The reasoning did not fit the actual policy, in the court’s view, because the FCC
stated at oral argument that not every occurrence of a fleeting expletive would be indecent
or profane under its rules. Id. For example, the FCC stated that an expletive occurring
during a bona fide news interview or instances when expletives were integral to a work
would be excused. Id.
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accept the first blow of expletives that would occur during excused
programs, and thus the FCC’s policy did not support its assertion of
concern for the viewing public.89 The court also rejected the FCC’s
arguments that an exemption for fleeting expletives would cause a
barrage of expletives at all hours of the day and that the categorical
requirement of repetition would be at odds with the FCC’s contextual
approach to indecency.90 Thus, the court found that the FCC had not
provided a reasoned analysis to justify a departure from previous policy
and that the new policy was invalid under the Administrative Procedure
Act.91
89
Id. at 459. See generally Justin Winquist, Comment, Arbitrary and F^@#$*! Capricious:
An Analysis of the Second Circuit’s Rejection of the FCC’s Fleeting Expletive Regulation in Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (2007), 57 AM. U.L. REV. 723 (2008) (discussing the Second
Circuit’s discussion of the first blow theory and how the court’s analysis precludes any
content-based approach to indecency). The “first blow” rationale was first described by the
Supreme Court in Pacifica. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) (“To say that one
may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like
saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.”).
90
Fox, 489 F.3d at 460. The court determined that these arguments were “devoid of any
evidence that suggest[ed] a fleeting expletive [was] harmful,” and did not establish “that
this harm [was] serious enough to warrant government regulation.” Id. at 461. In its
rejection of these two arguments, the court noted that the FCC’s new policy also included a
categorical approach—that all uses of “fuck” or “shit” fail under the first prong of the
indecency test—which seemed to conflict with the contextual approach the FCC followed.
Id. at 460. The court also said the FCC failed to provide an adequate explanation as to why
fleeting expletives suddenly would qualify under the unchanged indecency test. Id. See
generally Jane D. Brown et. al., Sexy Media Matter: Exposure to Sexual Content in Music,
Movies, Television, and Magazines Predicts Black and White Adolescents’ Sexual Behavior, 117
PEDIATRICS 1087 (2005); Anita Chandra et. al., Does Watching Sex on Television Predict Teen
Pregnancy? Findings From a National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 122 PEDIATRICS 1047, 1052
(2008) (“[F]requent exposure to sexual content on television predicts early pregnancy.”).
While these two studies address the harm arising out of sexual content, studies in the
future could show similar harm arising from youth exposure to expletives on broadcast
television. See Brown, supra; Chandra, supra.
91
Fox, 489 F.3d at, 462. The court remanded back to the FCC for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion, but the Supreme Court granted the FCC’s writ of certiorari.
See id. at 467; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.(Fox II), 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). See also Fox,
489 F.3d at 469 (Leval, J. dissenting). In dissent, Judge Leval found that the FCC had
offered a reasoned and sensible, “although not necessarily compelling,” explanation for its
change in policy. Id. Departing from the majority, Judge Leval determined that the reasons
proffered by the FCC were sufficient to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act’s
requirements because “[i]t made clear acknowledgment that its Golden Globe [Awards] and
[2006] Order rulings were not consistent with its prior standard regarding lack of repetition.
It announced the adoption of a new standard. And it furnished a reasoned explanation for
the change.” Id. at 470. Judge Leval faulted the majority for failing to give proper
deference to the FCC by substituting its own judgment for that of the agency and for
setting aside the FCC’s judgment based on disagreement. Id. at 472. Thus, because the
majority failed to give the FCC deference in matters within the agency’s competence, Judge
Leval dissented. Id. at 473. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (arbitrary and
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Even though the court disposed of the case under administrative law
theories, it still chose to address the constitutional issues that were fully
briefed and argued before the court because the court was skeptical that
the FCC would be able to put forth a reasoned analysis that would pass
constitutional muster.92 First, the court agreed with Fox and the other
networks that the FCC’s indecency test did not provide proper clarity
and unduly chilled free speech.93 Second, the court compared the FCC’s
indecency test with the identical test applied in the internet context that
was struck down in Reno v. ACLU as unconstitutionally vague.94 Third,
capricious standard); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (“The scope of review under the arbitrary
and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (stating that administrative
decisions should not be set aside “simply because the court is unhappy with the result
reached”).
92
Fox, 489 F.3d at 462 (noting that indecent speech is fully protected by the First
Amendment, including that which falls under the FCC’s policies). See generally Sable
Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (noting that indecent, but not obscene,
speech is protected under the First Amendment). The court introduced this portion of the
opinion in a footnote, stating that “[w]e recognize that what follows is dicta, but we note
that ‘dicta often serve extremely valuable purposes.’” Fox, 489 F.3d at 462 n.12 (quoting
Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249,
1252 (2006)). Furthermore, the court stated that it was following the fundamental principle
of judicial restraint on constitutional questions. Id. at 462.
93
Fox, 489 F.3d at 463 (noting also that the test required broadcasters to “‘steer far wider
of the unlawful zone’”) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). See John
Eggerton, Chernin: FCC Needs to Stop Regulating Speech, BROAD. & CABLE, Oct. 21, 2008,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6607430.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
In this article, News Corp. President and COO Peter Chernin is quoted as describing the
FCC’s per se indecency policy as “an absolute threat to the First Amendment.” Id.
94
Fox, 489 F.3d at 463 (“Because of the ‘vague contours’ of the regulation, the Court held
that ‘it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to
constitutional protection.’”) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)). See Reno, 521
U.S. 844.
The networks argued that the FCC’s indecency test was “undefined,
indiscernible, inconsistent, and consequently, unconstitutionally vague.” Fox, 489 F.3d at
463. However, in FCC v. Pacifica, the Supreme Court discussed the definition of indecency,
and did not suggest that the FCC’s construction of the term was unconstitutionally vague.
438 U.S. 726, 739–41 (1978) (discussing the definition of indecency and accepting the FCC’s
conclusion that Carlin’s monologue was indecent under the FCC’s interpretation of the
term). Moreover, in Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT I), the D.C. Circuit stated
that the Pacifica holding has been understood as implicitly rejecting that the FCC’s policy
was impermissibly vague. 852 F.2d 1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court noted that in
Pacifica, the Supreme Court did not address whether the indecency definition used by the
FCC was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1338 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741). Moreover,
the court noted that the Supreme Court quoted the definition with some approval. Id. at
1339. Given the tradition of the FCC’s indecency policy dating back to Pacifica and the
Supreme Court’s tendency to distinguish broadcasting from all other types of media or
technology, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would invalidate the FCC’s policy as void
for vagueness. See generally United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000)
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the court questioned whether the FCC was given arbitrary discretion to
sanction speech based on the speech’s merit, which the Supreme Court
has held unconstitutional in the licensing context.95 Finally, the court
questioned the appropriate level of scrutiny in response to Fox’s
arguments that the broadcast media should no longer enjoy the special
status that allows the media to avoid exacting scrutiny.96 However, the
(noting that the key difference between cable and broadcasting is that the option to block
programming is absent from broadcasting); Reno, 521 U.S. at 867 (“[A]s a matter of history
[the broadcast media have] ‘received the most limited First Amendment protection,’ [and
the internet has no comparable history.]”) (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748); Sable, 492 U.S.
at 127–28 (stating that telephone services are different than broadcasting because it requires
users to take an affirmative step, unlike broadcasting which is pervasive).
95
Fox, 489 F.3d at 464. To succeed on this argument, the networks need only show that
the FCC policy prevents the FCC from exercising its discretion in a content-based manner.
Id. The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that speech regulations cannot be based on the
subjective discretion of government officials, because such discretion could become a
means for suppressing viewpoints. Id. (citing Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S.
750, 758 (1988)). In the licensing context the Supreme Court has held that in situations
where “the government requires a license or permit in order for speech to occur,” three
requirements must be met: (1) “the government [must have] an important reason for
licensing”; (2) “there [must be] clear criteria leaving almost no discretion to the licensing
authority”; and (3) “there must be procedural safeguards.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 964–65 (3d ed. 2006). These criteria are
applied when licensing is used as a prior restraint. Id. at 964. See generally Alexander v.
United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (“‘[P]rior restraint[s]’ [are] . . . administrative and
judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that
such communications are to occur.’”) (quoting MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 4.03 (1984)).
96
Fox, 489 F.3d at 465. Exacting or strict scrutiny generally is applied in First
Amendment contexts. Id. at 464. However, because the broadcast media is unique for the
reasoning set forth in Pacifica, restrictions on broadcast speech are upheld if the restriction
is “‘narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest.’” Id. at 464–65
(quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984)). Fox and the networks
argued that the basis for the broadcast media’s unique treatment had been eviscerated, due
in part to the prevalence of cable and satellite television. Id. at 465. The court recognized
that in the future, the increasingly difficult task of describing broadcast media as uniquely
invasive could lead to the application of strict scrutiny in this area. Id. Further, the
networks relied on Playboy, which applied strict scrutiny to the cable television industry.
Id. See 529 U.S. 803. Playboy involved a statute which required cable operators who
provided sexually explicit channels to either fully scramble the content or limit the
transmission of such material into the safe harbor period between ten p.m. and six a.m. 529
U.S. at 806. The statute was invalidated because a less restrictive means was available. Id.
at 815. In Fox, Fox argued that the V-chip technology provided a similarly less restrictive
alternative for the broadcast media. Fox, 489 F.3d at 466. Although the court did not find
the argument completely persuasive, Playboy may indicate that technological advances
would diminish the FCC’s constitutional oversight of the broadcast media. Id. See generally
Marie A. Ryan, Note, To V or Not to V—That is the Regulatory Question: The Role of the VChip in Government Regulation of Broadcast and Cable Indecency, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 137,
168–75 (1997) (providing a general background of the V-chip’s development).
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court declined to part from Supreme Court precedent that has repeatedly
recognized a different standard for broadcast media.97 As a result, the
Second Circuit invalidated the FCC’s policy on administrative law
grounds, but only expressed constitutional doubts.98
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit on
administrative grounds.99
The Court found that the FCC had
acknowledged a change from prior policy and provided rational
justification for the change.100 Specifically, the Court said that it made
sense not to distinguish between literal and non-literal uses of expletives,
that it was within the Supreme Court’s holding in Pacifica to consider the
patent offensiveness of isolated expletives, and that it was logical “that a
safe harbor for single words would ‘likely lead to more widespread use
of the offensive language.’”101 The Court declined to decide the
constitutional issues, but noted the possibility that the FCC’s policy
could be unconstitutional.102 In closing, the Court stated: “The
Fox, 489 F.3d at 465. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 867 (“[A]s a matter of history [the
broadcast media have] ‘received the most limited First Amendment protection . . . .”)
(quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748).
98
See Fox, 489 F.3d at 467 (“[W]e are doubtful that the by merely proffering a reasoned
analysis for its new approach to indecency and profanity, the Commission can adequately
respond to the constitutional and statutory challenges raised by the Network
[Broadcasters].”).
99
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox II), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009). First, the
Court rejected the Second Circuit’s application of a heightened standard to changes in
administrative policy, stating that “[w]e find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act
or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching
review.” Id. at 1810. Second, the Court made clear that it would not “apply a more
stringent arbitrary-and-capricious review to agency actions that implicate constitutional
liberties.” Id. at 1811.
100
Id. at 1812 ( “There is no doubt that the Commission knew it was making a change.”).
101
Id. at 1813 (quoting Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their
Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globe Awards), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975
(2004) (memorandum opinion and order)). Additionally, the Court rejected the Second
Circuit’s reasoning that the FCC’s “first blow” theory of harm was unsupported. Id. The
Court stated that empirical evidence of harm was not necessary, but that “it suffice[d] to
know that children mimic the behavior.” Id. The Court noted that the FCC produced no
evidence of quantifiable harm in Pacifica, but the Court found then, as in Fox II, that the
government’s interest in the well-being of children justified regulation. Id. The Court also
rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning that the “‘first blow’ theory of harm would require
a categorical ban on all broadcasts of expletives.” Id. at 1814. This reasoning was
undermined by the FCC’s actual practice and prior context-based policy, and would be
better directed at an attack on the context-based system, not the fleeting expletive policy.
Id. Finally, the Court agreed with the FCC that “complete immunity for fleeting expletives,
ardently desired by broadcasters, [would logically] lead to a substantial increase in fleeting
expletives.” Id.
102
Id. at 1819 (“It is conceivable that the Commission’s orders may cause some
broadcasters to avoid certain language that is beyond the Commission’s reach under the
Constitution.”). The Court would not decide the issue without a lower court’s opinion. Id.
97
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Commission could reasonably conclude that the pervasiveness of foul
language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media
such as cable, justify more stringent regulation of broadcast programs so
as to give conscientious parents a relatively safe haven for their
children.”103
Congress created the FCC to regulate the broadcast airwaves for the
public interest, convenience, and necessity.104 As part of this mandate,
the FCC has regulated broadcast indecency through safe harbor times
and a complaint-driven indecency policy, and these policies have been
given deference based on the broadcast medium’s uniquely pervasive
nature and accessibility to children.105 The FCC has also acted under this
mandate to change the way in which it regulates fleeting indecency, but
these changes are unconstitutional and have been met strongly by
critics.106
III. ANALYSIS
Since the passage of the Radio Act in 1927, the FCC has been
entrusted to regulate the broadcast airwaves for the public convenience,
interest, and necessity.107 The scarcity of resources, the uniquely
pervasive nature of the broadcast media, and the government’s interest
in protecting children have each greatly shaped broadcast indecency
policies and have served as justifications for providing less First
Amendment protection to broadcasters.108 Part III.A explains that the
FCC’s attempted policy on fleeting indecency exceeds constitutional
Id. (finding that the Second Circuit disagreed with the FCC’s policy choices, but that
the Court could not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency).
104
See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (discussing legislation that created the
FCC).
105
See generally Genelle I. Belmas et. al., In the Dark: A Consumer Perspective on FCC
Broadcast Indecency Denials, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 67, 74 (2007) (discussing the complaint
process); How the FCC Resolves Obscenity/Indecency/Profanity Complaints,
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/flow.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2009); supra discussion Part II.B
(discussing the development of indecency policy including safe harbor provisions). Belmas
undertook the first systematic review of consumer complaints denied by the FCC. Belmas,
supra at 105. Belmas found “that profanity in lyrics, conversation, or dialogue, along with
sexual material and nudity, are of major concern to . . . American viewers and listeners,”
though “many Americans lack understanding of the functions or regulatory powers of the
FCC.” Id. at 99.
106
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007); infra Part III.B
(discussing criticism of FCC regulations).
107
See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (describing the public factors under
which the FCC regulates).
108
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (discussing pervasive quality of
media and the government’s interest in protecting children); supra notes 43–44 and
accompanying text (describing scarcity rationale).
103
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boundaries because it does not properly protect against the arbitrary
discretion of the FCC in determining what speech is indecent.109 Part
III.B discusses how Congress’s continuing mandate that the FCC
regulate for the public convenience, interest, and necessity requires that
the FCC regulate broadcast indecency despite arguments from the
broadcast networks and scholars that broadcast indecency regulation is
no longer justified.110 Part III.C illustrates that if, alternatively, the critics
prevail and broadcast indecency regulation is subjected to strict scrutiny
like other media, the FCC’s policy could survive a facial challenge.111
A. The FCC’s Fleeting Indecency Policy Affords the FCC an Unconstitutional
Level of Discretion
In 2004, the FCC changed its established policy to include the
regulation of fleeting materials.112 One criticism is that the application of
the new policy is inconsistent and in conflict with the First
Amendment.113 For example, in Fox v. FCC, the Second Circuit was
skeptical that the FCC’s fleeting indecency policy could pass
constitutional muster.114 The Second Circuit was correct that the FCC
cannot mandate that some words meet the first prong of the indecency
test per se because this change removed the barrier that prevented the
FCC from arbitrarily using discretion to determine what speech is
indecent.115
In Fox, the Second Circuit questioned the FCC’s determination that
some words were per se sexual or excretory under the first prong of the
indecency policy because it could permit the FCC to “sanction speech
based on its subjective view of the merit of that speech.”116 This concept

See infra Part III.A (discussing how per se determination of the first prong gives the
FCC too much discretion).
110
See infra Part III.B (discussing that the Pacifica justifications still serve as valid bases for
deferential treatment of broadcast indecency regulation).
111
See infra Part III.C (discussing how the FCC could regulate broadcast indecency and
still meet strict scrutiny); supra note 52 (differentiating between an “as applied” and
“facial” challenge).
112
See supra Parts II.B–C (describing prior policy and the changes).
113
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) (questioning the
constitutionality of the FCC’s indecency policy).
114
Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (“[T]he FCC’s indecency test raises the separate constitutional
question of whether it permits the FCC to sanction speech based on its subjective view of
the merit of that speech.”).
115
See id. (discussing that the policy may give the FCC too much discretion).
116
Id. (stating that the networks need not prove the FCC subjectively “‘exercised its
discretion in a content-based manner,’” but whether the policy prevented it from doing so)
(quoting Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 n.10 (1992)). In
Fox, the Second Circuit questioned the constitutionality of these changes based on
109
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was borrowed from the licensing context, in which, to constitute a valid
prior restraint, there must be an important government interest in
licensing, there must be “clear criteria leaving almost no discretion to the
licensing authority,” and “there must be procedural safeguards.”117
While the FCC’s policy is not a prior restraint, the concept provides a
useful framework for evaluating the FCC’s per se indecency policy.118
In applying this framework to the FCC’s per se indecency policy, the
FCC has two important reasons for regulating indecent broadcasts: the
pervasiveness of broadcasting and broadcasting’s unique accessibility to
children.119 In addition, the FCC’s indecency regulations do have
procedural safeguards.120 However, the second requirement of a valid
prior restraint is not met by the FCC when it determines that some
words are inherently sexual or excretory in nature, because the second
factor of the FCC’s indecency test alone vests too much discretion in the
FCC.121
Prior to 2004, the FCC’s indecency policy set out clear criteria that
prevented an abuse of discretion by including an objective prong that
limited the subjective decision-making of the FCC.122 Under that policy,
the FCC first objectively determined whether the challenged material
depicted sexual or excretory organs or activities.123 Because material that
was not determined to be objectively sexual or excretory in nature would
be dismissed as protected speech, this prong of the indecency test served
precedent from the licensing context. Id. In the licensing context, the Supreme Court has
invalidated speech regulations that give too much discretion to government officials. Id.
117
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 95, at 964–65. These criteria are applied when licensing is
used as a prior restraint. Id. at 964. See generally Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544,
550 (1993) (“‘[P]rior restraints’ [are] ‘administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued advance of the time that such communications are to
occur.’”) (quoting NIMMER, supra note 95, § 4.03).
118
See Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (applying the licensing prior restraint framework to question
the constitutionality of the FCC’s indecency policy).
119
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978).
120
See generally How the FCC Resolves Obscenity/Indecency/Profanity Complaints,
supra note 105. The FCC’s process is based upon consumer complaints. Id. The
Commission reviews complaints and either publishes an order dismissing the complaint or
issues a Notice of Apparent Liability to the broadcaster in question. Id. The broadcaster’s
response is analyzed, and the FCC then either dismisses the complaint or issues a
Forfeiture Order granting the complaint. Id. The broadcaster may challenge the Forfeiture
Order by an appeal to the federal courts of appeals. See 47 U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (describing
the administrative policies for judicial review of an agency decision).
121
See generally Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (questioning whether the FCC has too much
discretion under the policy).
122
See Indus. Guidance on the Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 &
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broads. Indecency (2001 Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R.
7999, 8002 (2001) (policy statement).
123
Id. para. 7, at 8002.
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as an important barrier against the contextual analysis of the second
prong.124 Under the more subjective second prong, the FCC determined
whether the material was patently offensive under contemporary
community standards, and “the full context in which the material
appeared [was] critically important.”125 The limitless variety of possible
broadcasts required that the FCC be more flexible and subjective when
determining this prong.126 Together, both questions ensured that the
FCC did not exercise its regulatory power arbitrarily.127
However, in 2004 when the FCC determined that all uses of “fuck”
and “shit” were inherently sexual or excretory in nature, it removed the
objective step that prevented the FCC from basing its regulatory
decisions solely on subjective discretion.128 Without that barrier, the
FCC’s indecency policy becomes a one-step determination based on its
interpretation of the factors, which could be based solely on a
determination of the speech’s merit.129 The FCC might not consistently

Id. para. 8, at 8002 (citing WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 1838,
1840–41 (2000)).
See also How the FCC Resolves Obscenity/Indecency/Profanity
Complaints, supra note 105.
125
2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 9, at 8002. See supra text accompanying note
72 (citing id. para. 10, at 8003, which states the factors considered when applying this
contextual approach).
126
See id. para. 9, at 8003 (“[C]ontextual determinations are necessarily highly factspecific, making it difficult to catalog comprehensively all of the possible contextual factors
that might exacerbate or mitigate the patent offensiveness of particular material.”).
127
See id. paras. 7–9, at 8002–03.
128
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 464 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing
concern that current FCC indecency test gives too much discretion to the FCC); Complaints
Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards”
Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, para. 8, at 4978 (2004) (memorandum opinion and order)
(finding variations of the word “fuck” to be presumptively sexual in nature); Complaints
Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R.
2664, para. 74, at 2684 (2006) (notices of apparent liability) (finding variations of the word
“shit” to be presumptively excretory in nature). But see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
(Fox II), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1814 (2009) (noting that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the
FCC to maintain some discretion through its context-based policy). The Supreme Court in
Fox II noted that the FCC’s policy of using context to determine whether fleeting expletives
were indecent was not arbitrary and capricious. Id. While under administrative law the
policy change was not arbitrary and capricious, the Court failed to note that the per se
policy did not just allow the FCC to retain “some” discretion, but the FCC transformed the
indecency policy into a purely subjective test. See id. The Court did not respond to the
Second Circuit’s speculation that the policy could be unconstitutional under this theory.
See id. at 1818.
129
See Fox, 489 F.3d at 464 (stating that the FCC’s policy may give it the discretion to
“sanction speech based on its subjective view of the merit of that speech”); 2001 Industry
Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 8, at 8003 (applying contemporary community standards of the
broadcast medium). See also Quale, supra note 15, at 230. Quale states that the second
prong of the policy is flawed, because “‘contemporary community standards’ become
124
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abuse its power, but it has created that “pervasive threat inherent in [the
censor’s] very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of
discussion.”130 Because of this danger, the FCC must eliminate the policy
that variations of “fuck” and “shit” are inherently sexual or excretory in
nature.131 Although the FCC’s current indecency policy gives the FCC
too much discretion, the general regulation of broadcast indecency is still
required, because it serves the public interest.132
B. Regulating Broadcast Indecency for the Public Interest, Convenience, and
Necessity
Critics of broadcast indecency regulation argue that the justifications
for regulating the content of the broadcast media are no longer valid.133
Thus, it is argued that like the regulation of other media, the regulation
of broadcast indecency must meet strict scrutiny.134 While the scarcity
rationale is no longer a relevant justification for allowing the FCC to
regulate broadcast indecency, the basic rationales articulated in Pacifica
are still valid.135 As such, the public interest, convenience, and necessity
require that broadcast indecency regulation still be evaluated under a
deferential scrutiny by the judiciary.136
The scarcity rationale was the traditional basis for the broadcast
industry’s limited First Amendment protection.137
The broadcast
industry, scholars, and even the FCC, have acknowledged that the
scarcity rationale is no longer a valid basis for indecency regulation.138
solely what organized interest groups, FCC staffers, and FCC Commissioners find patently
offensive” and the opinion of the average viewer or complainant is ignored. Id.
130
Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 n.10 (1992) (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)).
131
See infra Part IV (proposing new policy that eliminates the per se policy under the first
prong).
132
See infra discussion Part III.B (defending the justifications for regulating broadcast
indecency).
133
See infra discussion Part III.B (describing arguments against the regulation of
broadcast indecency).
134
See Fox, 489 F.3d at 465 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is increasingly difficult to describe the
broadcast media as uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to children, and at some
point in the future, strict scrutiny may properly apply in the context of regulating
broadcast television.”).
135
See infra notes 150–60 and accompanying text (discussing that broadcast television is
still uniquely pervasive and accessible to children).
136
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“And of all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection.”).
137
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that the scarcity
rationale permits the government to regulate the access and use of the broadcast airwaves).
138
See Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, para. 11, at 2699 (1987) (memorandum
opinion and order) (“[W]e no longer consider the argument of spectrum scarcity to provide
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From an economic standpoint, it is argued that any good or service in
great demand is scarce, so that the broadcast spectrum is no different
than print media.139 From a technological standpoint, it is argued that
the proliferation of media choices has made broadcast television
irrelevant or, at least, no longer unique.140 However, even if the scarcity
rationale no longer distinguishes broadcasting from other types of
media, a lack of scarcity does not eviscerate the distinct and unique
properties of the broadcast media recognized in Pacifica.141
In Pacifica, the Supreme Court distinguished the broadcast media
because it was uniquely pervasive and accessible to children.142
Recently, these justifications have been criticized for being out of sync
with modern life and unsupported by actual harm.143 A comprehensive
a sufficient basis for [indecency] regulation.”); ZELEZNY, supra note 35, at 360 (stating the
argument that the marketplace is full of channels of communication, broadcasting and
otherwise); Krotoszynski, supra note 59, at 929 (“Even at its inception, the scarcity rationale
was not a particularly powerful justification for affording broadcasters degraded First
Amendment rights.”).
139
Krotoszynski, supra note 59, at 929 (“The underlying economic reality is that if any
input in providing a good or service commands a price greater than zero, it is ‘scarce’ in
economic terms and limits market entry.”).
140
Id. at 932 (“[T]he ability to distribute programming free and clear of television and
radio stations makes their importance as a means of disseminating information and ideas
far less important a concern in 2008 than was the case in 1968—or even 1998.”); Holohan,
supra note 59, at 366 (“Because technological developments have blurred the distinction
between broadcast and non-broadcast electronic media, differing treatment of these forms
of communication is no longer legally defensible.”). For example, in the 1960s, when Red
Lion was decided, there were approximately 700 television stations in the United States.
ZELEZNY, supra note 35, at 360. In 2002, there were 1700 television stations, in addition to
the approximately 8000 cable television systems and the internet. Id.
141
See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49. The Pacifica Court stated:
[T]he broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence
in the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public,
but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be
left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder. . . .
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read.
Id.
142
Id.
143
See JEFFREY MCCALL, VIEWER DISCRETION ADVISED: TAKING CONTROL OF MASS MEDIA
INFLUENCES 36 (2007) (discussing the arguments for and against “authentic”
programming); Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting? Toward a Consistent First
Amendment Standard For the Information Age, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 431, 449 (2007)
(criticizing the pervasiveness justification as “far too inclusive and [it] could be applied to
any media outlet that is determined by regulators to be particularly pervasive in [people’s]
lives”); Holohan, supra note 59, at 365 (“[N]one of the institutions leading the antiindecency crusade have identified any actual harm caused by objectionable
programming.”).
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study of broadcast television content between 1998 and 2007 by the
Parents Television Council found that the use of harsh expletives had
risen sharply during hours when children are in the audience.144 The
broadcast industry recognizes that harsh language and content has
increased, but defends such content as being reflective of modern life.145
In response, supporters of broadcast regulation cite public polls that
suggest a majority of respondents would favor stricter content policies,
higher fines for violations, and indecency restrictions on cable.146 While
public approval does not equate to constitutional approval, these polls
do suggest that such programming is not indicative of modern life.147
Moreover, even though many people may use coarse language, most
recognize that it is often inappropriate.148 Because broadcast television is
part of the public airwaves, mandating a certain level of decorum is
justified.149
Despite the evidence of offensive content, the broadcast industry
also claims that any risk of harm to children by broadcasting has been
undermined or completely repudiated since the time of Pacifica, and that
no harm has been supported by evidence.150 However, recent studies
have linked both broadcast and cable television usage with higher
144
Press Release, Parents Television Council, supra note 8. The Parents Television
Council analyzed all primetime television entertainment programs that were broadcast on
the major networks between 1998 and 2007. Id. Moreover, the study found that harsher
expletives were broadcast earlier in the day during 2007 than during 1998. Id.
145
See Eggerton, supra note 93. News Corp. President and COO Peter Chernin said “Fox
[will] fight to the end for [the] ability to put occasionally controversial, offensive, and even
tasteless content on the air” because such programming is “provocative and accurately
reflects our society.” Id.
146
MCCALL, supra note 143, at 47. A Pew Research poll from 2005 found that seventyfive percent of respondents wanted tighter enforcement on indecency, sixty-nine percent in
favor of higher fines, and sixty percent in favor of holding cable accountable for indecency.
Id. See also Belmas, supra note 105, at 99 (stating that it is clear that indecent material is “of
major concern to . . . American viewers and listeners who took the time to write a letter or
note of complaint to the [FCC]”). In 2005, Congress passed a bill that would increase the
penalties for broadcasting indecent materials from a maximum of $25,000 per broadcast to
$325,000 per broadcast. Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-235,
§ 2, 120 Stat. 491 (2005). In 2007, legislation was introduced that would require the FCC to
maintain a policy that a single word or image may be considered indecent. Protecting
Children from Indecent Programming Act, S. 1780, 110th Cong. (2007). The statute was
referred to committee, but has not been passed. Id.
147
See MCCALL, supra note 143, at 36. McCall argues that primetime television is
recognized by viewers as far from authentic. Id.
148
Id. at 36 (“Even the most lowbrow of speakers has the gumption to not use foul
language in business settings . . . and in any setting for which proper decorum is
expected.”).
149
Id.
150
See John Eggerton, Media Institute Weighs In On Indecency, BROAD. & CABLE, Aug. 8,
2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6585792.html?nid=3343.
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instances of teen sex and teen pregnancy, suggesting a correlation
between broadcast television content and destructive behavior.151 That
correlation supports the theory of protecting youth from indecent
content by regulating broadcast indecency.152
In addition, critics argue that because children have access to
indecent material from a variety of unregulated sources, continuing to
give FCC regulation of the broadcast industry deferential treatment is
unfair.153 However, the Supreme Court has consistently distinguished
broadcasting from other forms of media.154 In Fox, the networks argued
that there was no basis for treating broadcast industry different from
other forms of media, in part, because a majority of American
households subscribe to cable or satellite television services.155 Yet, the
argument that an abundance of media eliminates the need for regulating
indecency wrongly assumes that parents or other viewers have an equal
opportunity to affirmatively say “no” to broadcast material as they do
with non-broadcast material.156 In Playboy, the Court differentiated cable
151
See Brown, supra note 90; Chandra, supra note 90, at 1052 (finding that “frequent
exposure to sexual content on television predicts early pregnancy”). Chandra selected
programs from both broadcast and cable television that were popular with teens. Chandra,
supra note 90, at 1049. Such programs included live-action, reality, sitcoms, dramas, and
animated shows. Id.
152
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (stating that the government’s
interest in the well-being of youth justified regulating broadcast indecency).
153
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The
proliferation of satellite and cable television channels—not to mention internet-based video
outlets—has begun to erode the ‘uniqueness’ of broadcast media . . . .”); Eggerton, supra
note 93.
154
See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (noting that the
key difference between cable and broadcasting is that the option to block programming is
absent from broadcasting); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997) (noting that “as a matter
of history” the broadcast media have “received the most limited First Amendment
protection,” and that the internet has no comparable history) (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
867); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127–28 (1989) (stating that
telephone services are different than broadcasting because it requires users to take an
affirmative step, unlike broadcasting which is pervasive).
155
Fox, 489 F.3d at 465 (“The Network [Broadcasters] contend[ed] that the bases for
treating broadcast media ‘differently’ have eroded over time . . . .”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
156
See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815; Fox, 489 F.3d at 466 n.14 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2006) as
mandating the placement of a blocking feature enabling viewers to filter commonly rated
programs on their television.) This technology is commonly known as the V-chip, and it
acts as a filter for individual programs of a chosen rating, which is distinguishable from
blocking entire cable channels or declining cable service altogether. See FCC, V-Chip:
Viewing Television Responsibility, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
The National Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable Television Association and
the Motion Picture Association of America created a television ratings system, which was
approved by the FCC. See id. See generally Ryan, supra note 96, at 168–75 (providing a
general background of the V-chip’s development). Playboy was decided in 2000, the year in
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from broadcasting because cable users can block certain channels, and no
comparable technology exists for broadcast television.157 In contrast,
broadcast television is free, and viewers or listeners might become
unwilling participants because “the airwaves confront[] the citizen, not
only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the
individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder.”158 In Pacifica, the Court rejected the
argument that a viewer could simply turn off offending content to avoid
further offense, and, despite the availability of other media forms, that
statement is still correct.159 Unless and until viewers can affirmatively
block broadcasts in a similar manner to non-broadcast media, an
inherent difference between the forms exists.160
Because the Pacifica justifications still exist, the FCC still has
authority to regulate indecent content in broadcasting.161 Given the
public’s opinion, Congress’s support, and studies of the ill-effects of
indecent programming on children, the FCC should regulate indecent
content on broadcast television to fulfill its duty to protect the public
interest.162 Nonetheless, even if the Supreme Court were to apply strict
scrutiny to broadcast indecency regulation, the FCC’s regulation should

which the requirement of 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) became active. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2006);
529 U.S. 803. In Playboy, the Supreme Court still relied on a user’s ability to affirmatively
block channels to differentiate between cable and broadcasting, which suggests the V-chip
may not negate the pervasiveness of broadcasting. See 529 U.S. at 815.
157
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815 (“[T]argeted blocking enables the Government to support
parental authority without affecting the First Amendment interests of speakers and willing
listeners . . . .”). See supra notes 96, 156 (discussing V-chip technology).
158
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. See also Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654,
660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[B]roadcast audiences have no choice but to ‘subscribe’ to the entire
output of traditional broadcasters.”); see Quale, supra note 15, at 207 (stating that
broadcasting is an integral and free aspect of society).
159
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49.
160
See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815. In Fox, the Second Circuit asserted in dicta that V-chip
technology would provide a less restrictive alternative than a total indecency ban. 489 F.3d
at 466. The court likened this technology to the choice viewers have with cable channels
and suggested that this advancement could negate the FCC’s authority to regulate
indecency. Id. The FCC argued that the V-chip is an ineffective alternative because “most
parents do not know how to use it, programs are often inaccurately rated, and fleeting
expletives . . . could elude V-chip blocking.” Id. Moreover, because of the deferential
treatment afforded to broadcasters, a less restrictive alternative to regulation is not
necessary. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726 (applying a deferential standard to broadcast media).
161
See Eggerton, supra note 93 (stating that FCC should no longer regulate broadcast
content).
162
See supra notes 150–60 and accompanying text (defending the validity of broadcast
indecency regulation).
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still be upheld as serving a compelling interest through narrowly
tailored means.163
C. Why the FCC’s Indecency Regulation Passes Strict Scrutiny
In Fox, the Second Circuit questioned whether it remained proper to
view broadcast regulation under a deferential scrutiny.164 Even if the
Second Circuit’s view were accepted, the regulation of broadcast
indecency could survive strict scrutiny in a facial challenge.165 First, the
justifications articulated in Pacifica would serve as the FCC’s compelling
interests.166 Second, an indecency policy, and not the V-chip, could serve
as the least restrictive means.167
Congress has directed the FCC to act for the public’s interest,
convenience, and necessity.168 The regulation of broadcast television is
in the public’s interest, convenience, and necessity because of its
uniquely pervasive presence in viewers’ homes and its accessibility to
children.169 Because an indecent broadcast “confronts the citizen, not
only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the
individual’s right to be left alone” is paramount, the FCC has a
compelling interest to regulate such broadcasts.170 In addition, the
government has a compelling “interest in the well-being of its youth and
in supporting parents’ claim to authority in their own household”
because broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children.171 Thus, even if
strict scrutiny is applied, the justifications that formerly served as a basis
for deferential treatment should be recognized as compelling interests in
the strict scrutiny analysis.172 The FCC must meet those interests with
the least restrictive means.173

See supra notes 96 (discussing strict scrutiny).
489 F.3d at 465.
165
Id. (“[A]t some point in the future, strict scrutiny may properly apply in the context of
regulating broadcast television.”).
166
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) (stating that broadcasting is
uniquely pervasive into the home and uniquely accessible to children).
167
See infra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (discussing why an indecency policy,
and not the V-chip, is the least restrictive means to serve the government’s compelling
interests). See also infra Part IV (proposing a new policy that could serve as the least
restrictive means).
168
47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
169
See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49.
170
Id. at 748.
171
Id. at 749 (internal quotation marks omitted).
172
See supra notes 150–60 and accompanying text (discussing continuing validity of the
Pacifica justifications).
173
See infra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (discussing indecency regulation as least
restrictive means).
163
164
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In Fox v. FCC, the networks argued that, under strict scrutiny, the
FCC could not regulate indecent broadcasts because the V-chip would
serve as a lesser restrictive means.174 Assuming that parents understand
how to use their V-chips and that the rating system is accurate, the Vchip could be an effective tool for preventing children from viewing
offensive content.175 However, the V-chip only addresses broadcasting’s
unique accessibility to children because the V-chip’s purpose is to allow
parents to control the content that their children can view based on
ratings.176 The V-chip does not adequately address broadcasting’s
pervasiveness because it can do nothing to prevent indecent content that
violates the safe harbor provisions or slips through the ratings system.177
Moreover, while protecting children is an important interest, broadcast
television invades the privacy of the home for both adults and children,
and it should not be expected that adults would use the V-chip to avoid
unwanted indecent content broadcast on the public airwaves.178 The Vchip’s deficiencies would make it difficult for a challenger to argue that
the V-chip is the least restrictive means under all circumstances.179 Thus,
in order for the FCC to truly address both the interests of privacy in
one’s home and protecting children from indecent broadcasts, the FCC
must be able to take action against those who violate the indecency
regulations.180
The FCC’s current indecency policy is unconstitutional because it
gives the FCC too much discretion in determining what material is
indecent and thus, unprotected.181 However, the public interest still
174
489 F.3d 444, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) (basing this argument on Playboy). In United States v.
Playboy, the FCC could not require the scrambling of certain channels because parents were
able to request that the cable company block offending channels. 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).
However, the use of the V-chip is distinguishable from the blocking technology in Playboy
because the issue with cable was certain indecent channels, not individual programs of a
certain rating. See id.
175
See Fox, 489 F.3d at 466 (stating that the FCC viewed the V-chip as an ineffective tool
because parents do not know how to use it and the ratings system could miss fleeting
expletives).
176
See generally FCC, V-Chip: Viewing Television Responsibility, supra note 156.
177
See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2008) (safe harbor rule); Action for Children’s
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding safe harbor times).
178
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“[I]ndecent material presented
over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder.”).
179
See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187 (2008) (“[A] facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute requires a showing that no set of circumstances exist under
which the statute would be valid . . . .”).
180
See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–49 (discussing the justifications for treating the
broadcast medium differently).
181
See supra discussion Part III.A (discussing that first prong is unconstitutional).
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requires that indecent broadcasts be regulated due to broadcasting’s
continuing pervasiveness and accessibility to children.182 Even if strict
scrutiny is applied, the FCC has compelling interests for regulating
broadcast indecency, and an indecency policy would be the least
restrictive means.183 Based on the foregoing, the FCC must revise its
current indecency policy to continue protecting the public’s convenience,
interest, and necessity; to remedy the constitutional problems with the
FCC’s indecency policy; and to protect broadcasters’ free speech by
putting them on clear notice of what type of content should be
avoided.184
IV. A PROPOSED POLICY FOR REGULATING BROADCAST INDECENCY
Despite a barrage of criticism from broadcasters, scholars, and
courts, the FCC must still regulate broadcast indecency for the public
interest.185 The FCC adequately can address its concern for fleeting
indecency through the application of its contextual approach, but the
FCC’s policy of per se sexual or excretory words is unconstitutional
because it allows for arbitrary discretion of power.186 Moreover, due to
the litigation invalidating much of the FCC’s most recent policy, it is
unclear what policy broadcasters will be responsible for following.187 In
response, Part IV proposes a new indecency policy to correct the
constitutional problems and to give clear guidance to the industry.188
In the interests of clarity and of avoiding constitutional problems,
the FCC must revisit its indecency policy.189 First, the FCC must retain
an objective step in its indecency analysis by returning to its 2001
interpretation of the first prong of its indecency test and eliminating per
se determinations of some words.190 Thus, the first step in the FCC’s
See supra discussion Part III.B (discussing that public interest requires broadcast
regulation).
183
See supra discussion Part III.C (discussing why broadcast regulation could meet strict
scrutiny).
184
See infra Part IV (proposing new policy).
185
See supra Part III.B (discussing that Pacifica’s justifications are still valid as bases for the
FCC’s indecency regime).
186
See supra text accompanying notes 82–84 (stating that fleeting utterances are not
insulated from the contextual approach); Part III.A (discussing constitutionality of per se
indecency policy).
187
See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,
489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
188
See infra Part IV (proposing new policy).
189
See supra text accompanying notes 186–87 (discussing why FCC must revise its
policy). See also Belmas, supra note 105, at 102 (suggesting that the FCC create and
publicize “clear, defensible indecency guidelines”).
190
See Indus. Guidance on the Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 &
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency (2001 Industry Guidance), 16 F.C.C.R
182
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indecency analysis simply should ask whether the challenged material
describes or depicts sexual or excretory functions.191 Second, the FCC
must revise its second prong of the indecency test, which the FCC
described in 2001 as asking whether the challenged material was
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium.192 The FCC provides three factors to aid in its
determination and has defined the standard as “that of an average
broadcast viewer or listener and not the sensibilities of any individual
complainant.”193 In order to provide clearer guidance to the industry,
the FCC should revise this second prong of the indecency analysis.194
In its revision of the indecency test’s second prong, the FCC should
incorporate the contextual factors into the main text of the policy, placing
greater weight on explicitness and shock value.195 Thus, the policy
would better protect against the language that is explicit or shocking for
no valuable purpose.196 In addition, the FCC should revise the
“contemporary community standard” language to better reflect the
subjective and contextual approach of the second prong.197 The new
policy should include the perspective of the reasonable viewer and
mention the importance of the complaint process in indecency
enforcement.198
Below, the proposed indecency policy is printed in full:
1) The material in the broadcast must fall within the
subject matter scope of the indecency definition—that is,
7999, para. 7, at 8002 (2001) (policy statement) (“[T]he material alleged to be indecent must
fall within the subject matter scope of our indecency definition—that is, the material must
describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities.”).
191
See id. (describing the first prong of the indecency test).
192
Id. para.8, at 8002 (stating that under the second prong, broadcasts must be “patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium”).
193
Id. The three factors are:
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of
sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells
on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or
activities; [and] (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been presented for its shock
value.
Id. para. 10, at 8003.
194
See infra text accompanying note 199 (proposing revisions to the indecency test).
195
See generally 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 10, at 8003 (listing factors).
196
See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (stating that indecent
words offend for the same reason obscene material offends).
197
See generally 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 8, at 8002 (describing
contemporary community standard).
198
See generally FCC, Complaint Process, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/process.html (last
visited Jan. 13, 2009) (describing the FCC’s complaint process).
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the material must describe or depict sexual or excretory
organs or activities.
2) The broadcast must be patently offensive as measured
by the reasonable broadcast viewer.
i) Although the sensibilities of any individual
complainant will not be given excessive weight, the
number of complaints about the specific broadcast
will be taken into the final consideration.
3) When determining whether material is patently
offensive, the Commission will focus on the explicitness or
graphic nature of the material. Material that is presented
gratuitously or for its own shock value will not be considered
valuable speech.
4) Fleeting instances of material that describe or depict sexual
or excretory organs or activities will not be immune from
regulation if the overall broadcast is found to be patently
offensive.
i) We note that technological advances have made it
possible as a general matter to prevent the broadcast
of a single offending word or action without
blocking or disproportionately disrupting the
message of the speaker or performer.
ii) The use of the technological advancements discussed in
paragraph (4)(i) is strongly encouraged during live
broadcasts. 199
This policy, although longer than the current two-prong indecency
test, provides clearer guidelines and puts broadcasters on sufficient
notice in regard to the importance of the contextual factors.200 It also
puts broadcasters on clear notice that fleeting instances of indecent
material are subject to regulation.201 Although this policy addresses the

Material in normal typeface is paraphrased from 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R.
7999 and Complaints Against Various Broadcasts Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden
Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) (memorandum opinion and order).
Material in italic typeface is the proposed changes of the author.
200
Compare 2001 Industry Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. para. 7–8, at 8002 (two-prong policy), with
supra text accompanying note 199 (proposed policy). Critics may argue that this policy
does not differ substantially enough from the current policy, except for eliminating the per
se determination under the first prong. However, by explicitly incorporating the FCC’s
interpretive guidance into the actual policy, a clearer and less discretionary policy is
created.
201
See supra text accompanying note 199 (proposed policy).
199
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issues identified above, to give the policy more weight, the FCC should
introduce the policy as a proposed federal rule.202
Codifying a federal rule is desirable for broadcast indecency
regulation because the process requires public notice and solicitation of
the public’s comments.203 Following this procedure will enable the FCC
to solicit input from the public, thus truly considering the public interest,
convenience, and necessity.204 In addition, the broadcast media would
also be involved in the process, which will not only put them on clear
notice, but also will ensure that the opinions of the industry are taken
fully into consideration.205 Finally, if the FCC’s indecency policy was
incorporated into a federal rule, it would ensure that the FCC could not
unilaterally change its policy.206 If the FCC enacted the proposed policy,
it would remedy the constitutional problems with the current indecency
policy and protect broadcasters’ free speech by putting them on clear
notice of what type of content should be avoided.207
V. CONCLUSION
In 1961, then FCC Chairman Minow concluded his speech to the
National Association of Broadcasters with the following words:
Television and all who participate in it are jointly
accountable to the American public for respect for the
special needs of children, for community responsibility,
for the advancement of education and culture, for the
acceptability of the program materials chosen, for
decency and decorum in production, and for propriety
in advertising. This responsibility cannot be discharged
by any given group of programs, but can be discharged
only through the highest standards of respect for the
American home, applied to every moment of every
program presented by television.
202
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (agency rule making procedure). Agencies must publish
notice of the proposed rule in the Federal Register, solicit public comment on the proposed
rule, and consider the public’s response before publishing a final rule. Id.
203
See generally id.
204
See generally id.
205
See generally Eggerton, supra note 93 (discussing media executive’s displeasure with
the FCC); Eggerton, supra note 150 (discussing media organization’s displeasure with the
FCC).
206
See 5 U.S.C. § 553. The notice and comment procedure acts as an additional safeguard
against arbitrary policy changes. See Administrative Procedure Act, Id. § 706(2)(A) (2006)
(stating that reviewing courts shall set aside agency actions which are arbitrary and
capricious).
207
See supra text accompanying note 199 (proposed policy).
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Program materials should enlarge the horizons of
the viewer, provide him with wholesome entertainment,
afford helpful stimulation, and remind him of the
responsibilities which the citizen has toward his
society.208
Despite the passage of forty-eight years, these words still serve as
pertinent advice to television broadcasters. Television does not always
meet the standards described by Chairman Minow, and, as a result, the
FCC’s indecency regulation acts as a check on broadcasters to ensure that
the public’s interest, convenience, and necessity are being served. To
serve that end, the FCC must enact a policy that remedies the
constitutional problems with the FCC’s current indecency policy and
protects broadcasters’ free speech by putting them on clear notice of
what type of content should be avoided.209 Ideally, the broadcast
networks would then aspire to provide the public with better content,
not in the vein of self-censorship, but with the purpose of serving
society.
Abigail T. Rom*

208
Minow, supra note 1, at 404 (reading from the National Association for Broadcasters’
television code).
209
See supra text accompanying note 199 (proposed policy).
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